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Abstract
Using Egypt, Libya, and Syria as primary case studies, this project qualitatively analyzes
the recent uprisings in each of these nations with focus on what factors influenced soldiers to
defect. Paying specific attention to the role of the international community, the power of
nonviolent tactics, the influence of ethnic and religious divisions, and examining what happens
when the opposition forces turn violent, these decisions by military personnel are deconstructed
by analyzing their triggers. While the topic of military defections is a fairly new focus in
revolutionary studies, this research serves as a talking point and gives insight into where future
research could occur.
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Introduction
³+HDLPHGKLV$.-47 just above their heads, prayed to God not to make hi m a killer and pulled
WKHWULJJHU´1
This statement describes the first time Ammar Cheikh Omar, 29, was ordered to fire upon
unarmed protestors in Syria. Omar, born in Germany to Syrian parents, had moved to Syria
in 2004 to Aleppo, a city LQ6\ULD¶VQRUWK³with the aim of getting in touch with his roots,
studying law, improving his Arabic and finding a wife.´2 ,QKHZDVFRQVFULSWHGLQWR6\ULD¶V
military shortly before the Arab Spring Movement began with the Tunisian Revolution. He was
then deployed to the Syrian cities of 'DUD¶D'XPDand Hama as part of the attempts by Syrian
President Bashir Al-Assad to violently suppress 6\ULD¶VRZQSURWHVWV Omar describes at first he
and his fellow soldiers were ³told that their main task was to deIHQGWKHFRXQWU\DJDLQVW,VUDHO´
DQG³that the SURWHVWHUVZHUH³WHUURULVWV´RU³DUPHGJDQJV´VSRQVRUHGE\IRUHLJQIRUFHV´3 In
Duma he was also ordered to attend interrogations as a scribe as prisoners, some as young as
fifteen, were tortured,WZDVLQ+DPD³At noon on July 26, he said, he and two fellow officers
decided to defect from their army base, changing into civilian clothes and jumping over the
EDVH¶VZDOO´ 4They would then travel by car and then foot to Hatay, Turkey where they met up
members of the Free Syrian Army and settled into a refugee camp. Now Omar works as part of
the rebel army smuggling wounded rebel soldiers into Turkey. While he says he fears for his

1
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family who remained in Syria, he has no regrets and ³0\IDPLO\NQRZV,PDGHWKHULJKW
FKRLFH´5 He also appeals for help from the LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\VD\LQJWKDW³+LWOHUGLHGLQ
*HUPDQ\EXWDZRNHLQ6\ULD´6
2PDU¶VVWRU\LVQRWDXQLTXHRQHLQ6\ULDZKHUHGHIHFWLRQVKDYHEHFRPHFRPPRQGXULQJ
the two year conflict. Across the Middle East and Northern Africa defections have played a key
role during the Arab Spring Movement in determining the fate of authoritarian regimes that
depend heavily on the military for power. This research project explores why soldiers have
chosen to defect particularly focusing on the role of ethnic and religious divisions, the threat of
international intervention, orders by the regime to violently crackdown on nonviolent protestors,
and when the opposition becomes armed.
The interactions between the military and its corresponding regime and the relationship
between the military and a QDWLRQ¶V civilian population are quite complex and at times
conflicting. During periods of major internal unrest these relationships between the three actors,
the military, civilian population, and regime, are further stressed. In addition, these relations and
interactions tend to come under intense scrutiny not only by those directly involved, but also by
the international community. It is during these moments of significant internal unrest that these
ties between the civilian population, regime, and military play a central role in deciding the
outcome of the conflict. Part of the reason the interactions between these three actors are of such
extreme importance is that they are far from static and each country has its own unique power
structure; therefore, each case unfolds differently. The commitment of the military to the regime
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and whether, and to what extent, the military sides with the popular uprising is one way the
outcome of revolutions is often determined. When the military refrains from assisting the regime
in its efforts to effectively control the nation, that UHJLPH¶VFKDQFHVRIVXUYLYDO is greatly
decreased. As academic Zoltan Barany stated in his article regarding the role of the military
during 2011 Arab Spring Movement³QRUHYROXWLRQZLWKLQDVWDWHFDQVXFFHHGZLWKRXWWKH
VXSSRUWRUDWOHDVWWKHDFTXLHVFHQFHRILWVDUPHGIRUFHV´7 This concept that revolutions need the
armed forces to either support them or at least remain neutral has been generalized by many
renowned academics and is applicable to popular uprisings outside WKHVFRSHRI%DUDQ\¶s focus
as well.8
Recently these decisive relationships between military, civilian population and regime
have come under greater examination as their importance was brought to the forefront of the
attention of scholars and the general public in 2011 during the momentous and heavily reported
Arab Spring Movement. During this time the civilian populations of many countries in Northern
Africa and the Middle East protested government policies to varying degrees with several of
these mass protests resulting in complete regime change most notably Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.
However, the unrest in this region started by the Arab Spring Movement remains unfinished;
most prominent has been the continuing upheaval in Syria although other countries in the region
continue to demonstrate varying levels of unrest as well. Therefore, the relevance of civilmilitary and regime-military relations in the area KDVQRWGLPLQLVKHGVLQFHWKH$UDE6SULQJ¶VVWDUW
over two years ago.

7

Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 2011) Academic Search
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2012): 24.
8
Mark N Katz, ³'HPRFUDWLF5HYROXWLRQV:K\6RPH6XFFHHG:K\2WKHUV)DLO´$XJ-31, 2003:1-12. Erica
Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, 2011, Why Civil Resistance Works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict . New
York: Columbia University Press: 46. Sharon Erickson Nepstad. Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the
Late 20th Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011: 128.
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The academic community has spent a considerable amount of time analyzing the outcome
of revolutions like those mentioned as part of the Arab Spring. As previously discussed, there
has also been extensive research done concerning the role of the military in deciding the fate of
popular uprisings. However, the importance of the specific factors that have influenced military
persRQQHO¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHIHFWKDYH failed to be fully explored. This is important since the role of
the military during these dilemmas cannot be fully understood without further analysis or as long
as the rifts within the armed forces remain overlooked. Therefore, these events can only be fully
comprehended after the reasons soldiers defect, how the military influences the outcome of the
uprising, and the overall nature of the revolution are adequately analyzed. Full analysis of the
situation can also determine if there is the possibility of generalizing this research and its
findings to other movements of similar natures.
This project examines the overall importance of military defections during periods of
rebellion. In addition what qualifies as a military defection, regime, pillar of support, nonviolent
movement, and effective control are clarified in the context of this project. My research primarily
addresses which factors during rebellions have previously influenced military defections in
revolutions and to what extent. Prior literature available on the general subject matter of military
defections is first be analyzed in regards to the quality and methodology of the literature and how
it contributes to this field. What material that is already available on the factors influencing
military defections is also be examined. Specifically my project focuses on and examines the
prior literature as well as blogs, interviews, and other sources of media there are regarding my
three primary independent variables. These variables include: the influence of ethnic and
religious divisions in the nation, the threat of international intervention, and armed opposition
and the regime ordering violence against nonviolent protestors RQPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO¶VGHFLVLRQV
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to defect. The three case studies I subsequently focus my research on include the revolution in
Egypt and the uprisings turned civil wars in Libya, and Syria. My research starts with the
beginning of the Arab Spring Movement in January 2011 and continues on to analyze the
ongoing events in Syria up until the beginning of 2013.
The limitations of my research design are also examined in order show how I was able
best proceed in a manner that was best able to adequately answer the questions regarding my
hypotheses. First the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are presented separately in order to
give readers a general background on the movements. Next, each of my three hypothesis are
presented followed by an examination of the role the independent variables²ethnic and religious
divisions, international intervention, and violent crackdowns and armed opposition²in each of
the revolutions. After I examined each hypothesis in conjunction with my case studies, I
analyzed the validity of the hypothesis and how it generally stood up in light of the evidence
presented by my case studies. After this analysis conclusions were made regarding the role of
both internal and external factors such as the effect of ethnic and religious divisions, armed
opposition in comparison to nonviolent movements, and the possibility of international
intervention on military defections in the respective case studies. In addition to my conclusion, I
also briefly address what more can be done to further contribute to this particular field of study.
At the beginning of this project I believed research would demonstrate a positive correlation
between the occurrences of military defections if there was the possibility of international
intervention, if soldiers do not share ethnic or religious ties with the regime, and if the opposition
remained primarily nonviolent. Conversely I originally thought there would be a negative
correlation between the defections of military personnel if the opposition was armed.
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The military during times of unrest has consistently proved itself as an important, if not
the most significant, pillar of support for regimes, particularly ones of oppressive natures.
Conversely, as the Arab Spring Movement demonstrated and continues to demonstrate in
numerous countries throughout the Middle East and Northeast Africa, when the military
withdrawVWKHLUVXSSRUWIRUWKHUHJLPHLWFDQKDYHGHYDVWDWLQJHIIHFWVRQWKDWOHDGHU¶Vability to
maintain effective control. Instead this removal of support opens up these authoritarian regimes,
particularly its leaders, to international condemnation for how they responded to the internal
unrest. Based on how the regime ordered the military and the state police forces to interact with
the general population during these periods of unrest, international intervention can become a
possibility as well. It is important to note that international intervention is also often driven by
the national interests of the countries intervening and regional dynamics. In more extreme cases,
such as my case studies, with or without the presence of international intervention, the survival
of the regime becomes greatly jeopardized during these events.
It is quite evident that the incidents of military defections demonstrate discontent as well
as a change in the power structure of civil-military and government-military relations; however,
these actions must also be sorted into a variety of categories. Defections as defined by my project
will focus on the shift of loyalty by military personnel away from the regime. In the traditional
sense this is often demonstrated by soldiers abandoning their positions by either fleeing the
conflict zone or by taking up arms against the regime tend to receive the majority of the attention
by both academics and the media. In addition, defections can also occur in a less sensationalized
manner when soldiers decide to refrain from showing up for duty or when they refuse to carry
out specific orders from the regime. For my purposes, defection will be defined as both of these
actions and can be carried out by either an individual, small group, or by the military as a whole.
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Full scale defection by the military as a single unit typically occurs when the command
withdraws support for the regime on behalf of the entire armed forces. This type of mass
rebellion will be considered a form of military defection regardless of whether or not the armed
forces then take an active or neutral stance against the regime. It is also important to
acknowledge that the factors influencing authority figures in the armed forces to defect or to
declare their removal of support for a regime on behalf of the armed forces may be different than
those impacting the decisions of individuals in the lower ranks. This is due to power incentives
between these ranks typically being considerably different. Differences in the religious or ethnic
makeup between the command and lower ranking military personnel can also factor into the
different stances of these groups.
To clarify my research it helps to further explore several of the terms and concepts used
in this project for those unfamiliar to this field and topic. First of all, I will use the term regime in
its traditional sense as meaning a form of government, particularly one of authoritarian nature.
As defined by Gene Sharp, the pillars of support for a regime are, ³7KHLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVHFWLRQV
of the society that supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to maintain and
expand its power capacity.´9 ([DPSOHVRISLOODUVRIVXSSRUWLQFOXGH³SROLFHSULVRQVDQG
military forces supplying sanctions, moral and religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy),
labor groups and business and investment groups supplying economic resources, and similarly
ZLWKWKHRWKHULGHQWLILHGVRXUFHVRISROLWLFDOSRZHU´10 Another concept that needs a more indepth explanation is what qualifies as a nonviolent movement in comparison to a violent
movement as almost all movements are neither completely violent nor completely nonviolent in

9

Gene Sharp, The Albert Einstein Institute, "There Are Realistic Alternatives." Last modified 2003,
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/TARA.pdf.: 35
10
Gene Sharp, The Albert Einstein Institute, "There Are Realistic Alternatives." Last modified 2003,
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/TARA.pdf.: 36
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nature. Using the work of academics Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan as well as Gene Sharp
as a guide, movements can be labeled as nonviolent based on the prevalence of nonviolent
methods and the observable participation by members of the movement in manners that are
nonviolent in nature. On the other hand, while violent movements often operate outside the
normal political forum like nonviolent movements, they predominantly rely on a strategy of
armed struggle in attempts to achieve their political goal.11 To further separate nonviolent and
violent movements, I will be using the term violence in its fairly narrow sense as an actual
physical attack that is done with the intent to injure ,ZLOODOVRGHILQHHIIHFWLYHFRQWURODVDVWDWH¶V
ability to carry out the basic tasks of providing security for itself and its civilians, formulate and
enact policies, and reconcile freedom with equality.
During the predominantly nonviolent Egyptian Revolution the influential phenomenon of
wavering military loyalties was clearly demonstrated. Defection was quite common during this
revolution by individuals in the armed forces, particularly those of lower rank as many refused to
report to duty and instead partook in the massive demonstrations. As the revolution progressed,
the entirety of the military ended up withdrawing their support for the regime, although the
military elites never publically sided with the nonviolent movement. Instead, they acted from
within by pressuring Mubarak to step down only eighteen day into the revolution. This large
scale action ended President MubarDN¶VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\FRQWUROWKHQDWLRQ and consequently
resulted in the televised announcement of his resignation by Vice President Saleiman. Military
loyalty has also become an increasingly difficult as well as more visible problem for the Assad
regime in Syria as small and large scale defections have been highlighted throughout the conflict.
/LE\D¶VHLJKWPRQWKUHYROXWLRQWXUQHGFLYLl war also demonstrated the role of the military as a

11

Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, 2011, Why Civil Resistance Works: the strategic logic of nonviolent
conflict. New York: Columbia University Press: 12.
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decisive factor as the armed forces split and many militants defected and took up arms against
their former employer. Despite these three revolutions having unfolded quite differently, and that
the conflict in Syria has remained ongoing, the magnitude of military loyalty to the survival of a
regime is clearly highlighted in all three scenarios. While the importance of military defection
has been demonstrated in each case study, the factors influencing military personnel to defect
have varied. The weight of particular factors over others in influencing these defections is also
rather unique. The relationship between the military and civilian population has also accounted
for a significant portion of these differences in defections and, therefore variation in revolution
outcomes. Ultimately, the goal of my project, as previously stated, is to address what factors,
have influenced military defections in Egypt, Libya, and Syria during their respective rebellions.
It is important to note that my scope of focus at this time does not include the overall outcome of
the rebellions or the role of the military post regime change. Also I will view each FRXQWU\¶V
police forces as being a separate entity from the armed forces as these two branches of
enforcement serve different purposes, have different relations with the civilian population and
the regime, and have reacted in dissimilar manners from one another during these revolutions.
Therefore, focus will remain on the military, DQGWKHUROHDQGDFWLRQVRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VSROLFHIRUFHV
will not be analyzed in any depth in this project.
If defections are not addressed by the regime and continue spread, or if the armed forces
as a whole decide it is in their best interests to side with a rebellion the effects of these actions
can be devastating to the regime. In some cases the military may even fully withdraw its support
for the regime. This action as presented by Barany, almost always results in the UHJLPH¶V
collapse.12 On the other hand, as currently demonstrated by the situation in Syria, as long as the

12

Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 2011) Academic Search
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majority of the military remains loyal to the regime and other external factors exert minimal
influence, the conflict can become drawn out often accompanied by a heavy death toll and result
in no serious change in regime standing or any internal reform. This will occur as long as the
power balance favors the existing regime.
The intent of my research project is to add a new dimension to the study of revolutions
through the examination of what influences military personnel to defect. Several fields of study
have already done a fairly thorough job of dissecting the importance of military loyalty to a
regime during a rebellion, and most academics have come to similar conclusions in that
rebellions must gain the support of the military to successfully bring about regime change.
Recent research that has had a heavier emphasis on statistical analysis during its examination of
the greater effectiveness of nonviolent strategies against oppressive regimes in comparison to
violent tactics has further challenged more traditional explanations.13 However, the causes
behind wavering military allegiance have been fairly neglected by research. I wish to further
unite the more traditional study of revolutions with newer perspectives by examining the impact
of several factors on defection, making sure to include the influence of nonviolence as a strategy
utilized by revolutionary groups RQVROGLHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRGHIect. In addition to the civil-military
relationship, I will also analyze the impact of the international community and the role of the
UHJLPHRQVROGLHUV¶FKRLFHVWRGHIHct, among other factors.
The specific hypotheses I will address that examine the factors influencing military
personnel to defect include:

13

Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, 2011, Why Civil Resistance Works: the strategic logic of nonviolent
conflict, New York: Columbia University Press

18

H 1- Military personnel are more likely to defect if the opposition force is of the same ethnic or
religious makeup as them and if the majority of the high ranking officials within the government
come from a different ethnic or religious group.
H 2-Military personnel are more likely to defect if the international community promises direct
military intervention in opposition to the current regime.
H 3-Military personnel are more likely to defect if the regime orders them to fire upon or in any
other way violently crackdown on unarmed civilians and conversely, military personnel are less
likely to defect if the opposition is armed and violent.
These original hypotheses were reached primarily by following the Western news during
the Arab Spring Movements and my own curiosity. I noted that the topics of international
intervention, ethnic and religious divisions, and the brutal crackdown by regimes and nonviolent
tactics used by the opposition were often discussed and stood out the most to me. Therefore, I
chose these three variables and the corresponding hypotheses to be my focus during this project
to see if the perceptions I had of their roles on defection in each movement were accurate and if
not, why.
While my research goals are somewhat lofty, I must also address the various limitations I
face. I acknowledge there are many more factors that weigh into the decisions of military
personnel to defect during periods of revolution than those listed above and that my research will
not adequately address or analyze them all. However, limiting my independent variables will
allow for more in-depth analysis and greater comparison between the case studies to determine if
there are any significant similarities. There are also several restrictions I face in obtaining
information. Travel to Egypt, Libya, or Syria to conduct on site research and personal interviews
at this time are not feasible due to my ongoing education and high levels of unrest that continue
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to plague portions of these countries. These travel limitations also suggest that there may be a
decrease in the availability of primary sources, especially those published in English, to the
outside world. Others wishing to report on the conflicts firsthand are likely to have experienced
similar obstacles in traveling to the region. Another setback about being half a world removed
from the places of interest is my lack of complete cultural understanding of the three nations. I
have tried to familiarize myself on the roles of ethnic groups within the conflicts and the history
of the regime leading up to the rebellion by examining other research articles and books whose
focus is outside the duration of the Arab Spring Movement and on factors that have influenced
the state of the nation outside that of the military. However, it would be foolish to claim the
ability of having complete understanding of their cultural implications as an outsider. Lastly, the
biggest obstacle from a cultural perspective that I will strive to overcome in my research is the
language barrier as English is only language I am fluent in. Therefore, most of my sources have
been published in English or in a few fortunate cases have been translated from the original
Arabic to English.
There are also considerable difficulties involved with quantitatively analyzing military
defections as well. Specific statistics on military defections by nation have proved impossible to
acquire as these numbers are not publically published by any of militaries I have attempted to
access. I also was unable to find military records regarding nations outside my scope of interest
to use as control variables to make comparisons. Instead, most of the previous academic research
I have found centered on military defections is focused on specific cases and not on the
occurrence of military defection as a whole. This is likely due to countries¶ unwillingness to selfreport on this problem. In addition defections during periods of major internal unrest are likely
difficult to gauge when the conflict is violent in nature as accurate reporting becomes more
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difficult. The idea of military defections is also not as clear cut as it first appears. To reiterate, I
will define defections as the action of fleeing the service, taking up arms against the regime,
refusing to report to work, or continuing to report to work, but refusing to obey specific orders.
These actions of defiance by military figures can be taken by individuals, small groups, or the
armed forces as a whole through decisions by the command. Therefore, due to the nature of the
types of defections some are more heavily reported and receive more attention than others.
The conflict in Syria must also specifically be addressed. Due to the ongoing nature of
this rebellion, conditions are liable to change without much warning and there is always a
possibility that this movement could come to an abrupt end during the writing of this paper.
These changes are also less likely to be adequately reported or be analyzed in a timely manner as
the violence within the country has only been intensifying. Egypt also poses a problem, although
LQWHUHVWLQJO\HQRXJKEHFDXVHRILWVUHYROXWLRQ¶VTXLFNVXFFHVV and overwhelmingly nonviolent
nature. DXHWRWKHPRYHPHQW¶VVSHHGDQGXQLW\WKHIRFXVRf most academics has been on its
more turbulent aftermath. What information there is on the role of the military and its interaction
with the civilian population primarily focuses on the time after Mubarak stepped down rather
than the events that occurred during the actual period of revolution.
Despite these numerous obstacles, examining the factors that influence military
defections is still feasible. However, my research will have to take on more of a qualitative
format than that of a statistical analysis due to the present availability of sources. As more time
elapses since the end of the revolution in Egypt an increasing amount of academic articles are
being published. This should shed greater light on the moments within the revolution and not just
LWVDIWHUPDWK6DPHFDQEHVDLGRIWKHDPRXQWRIPDWHULDOIRFXVHGRQ/LE\D¶VFLYLOZDU Although
Syria is the youngest of these rebellions, the steady trickle of defections, greater duration,
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increased violence by both sides, and international tension over how to proceed, seems to have
attracted more media and scholarly attention. This has resulted in a plethora of sources giving
significant attention to the role of the military and the factors that have influenced defection.
Therefore, despite the numerous limitations to my research project, I am confident that there has
been adequate material available to produce major findings regarding the factors that influence
defections in Egypt, Libya, and Syria during the Arab Spring Movement.
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A Look at the Existing Research
The existing research regarding my topic must be broken down into several categories.
The first section will explore the literature available on my dependent variable: military
defections. While the focus of my research is on Egypt, Libya, and Syria, this section will serve
to investigate what previous academic information has been published on military defections in
general during periods of revolution. After that I will examine the information available on my
independent variables individually. In this second portion I will specifically focus on the impact
of ethnic and religious divisions, the threat of international intervention, regimes ordering violent
crackdowns on nonviolent protestors and armed opposition on the likelihood of military
personnel to defect during major periods of unrest. In some cases there may also be crossover
between two or more of the independent variables, in which previous academics have found
correlation between variables in connection to military defections. The methodology of the prior
research in this field will be analyzed and gaps will be explored. In addition I will discuss how
my research fits in with the existing literature.
Although the literature review section of my paper will highlight what academic work
has already been done in this area, GXHWRWKHPRYHPHQWV¶UHFHQWDVZHOODVRQJRLQJQDWXUe
purely academic sources will not adequately provide all of the information needed. To make up
IRUWKLVODFNRIGHSWKUHJDUGLQJWKHWRSLF¶VH[SORUDWLRQLQWKHDFDGemic community, I will rely
heavily on primary sources that focus on my case studies as well as newspaper articles and blog
posts. Although this is somewhat unconventional, primary sources as well as trustworthy news
sources will serve to fill these current gaps in this field.

M ilitary Defections
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Unfortunately for my project, the majority of research on military defections focuses little
on what drives soldiers to defect, but instead emphasizes what impact military defections have
on the survival of the regime. As previously discussed, statistics on military defections are not
readily available to the public; therefore, much of the literature on military defections focuses on
specific defections by individuals rather than the overall occurrence of defection. This prior
research on the defections of individuals seems to be of little importance to my project since
most cases examined are prior to the twentieth century. Research and general reports on military
defection are also skewed because they primarily examine defection when it occurs as an order
from the top ranks of the armed forces to cease cooperation with the regime. Studies on defection
also have the propensity to focus on the actions of individuals that have fled the country as a
form of dissent or taken up arms and joined the opposition. This leaves little analysis regarding
the actions of individuals in the lower ranks or defections that occur in the form of individuals or
small groups refraining from carrying out regime orders while still remaining in the service.
However, there is still some general investigation regarding military defections during periods of
revolution that has been published by academics.
Gene Sharp is an individual that stands out in the field of revolutionary studies for work
that emphasizes the role of the military6KDUSKDVEHHQKHUDOGHGDVWKH³IDWKHURIQRQYLROHQW
VWUXJJOH´DQGKDVSXEOLVKHGQXPHURXVZRUNVRQWKHVXEMHFWRIQRQYLRlence and revolutions.14 His
influential works which can be found published in many languages as well banned in several
QDWLRQVPRVWQRWDEO\LQFOXGHV³)URP'LFWDWRUVKLSWR'HPRFUDF\´ZKLFKLVHVVHQWLDOO\

14

Mairi Mackay, CNNWorld, "Gene Sharp: A dictator's worst nightmare," Last modified June 25, 2012. Accessed
October 28, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/23/world/gene-sharp-revolutionary/index.html.

24

considered to EH³D-page guide to toppling autocrDWV´15 6KDUS¶VZRUNs have also been
credited with inspiring and shaping WKHQRQYLROHQWPRYHPHQWLQ(J\SW¶VUHYROXWLRQ His
work concludes that the military is the key pillar of support for regimes and that nonviolent
tactics are more likely to result in defections than violent tactics.
Another example of research on defections would be a conference paper by Mark N. Katz
presented at the 2003 Annual meeting of the American Political Association WLWOHG³'HPRFUDWLF
5HYROXWLRQV:K\6RPH6XFFHHG:K\2WKHUV)DLO´7KLVSDSHU analyzes six revolutions, three
successful (The Philippines 1986, Russia 1991, and Serbia 2000), and three unsuccessful (China
1989, Burma/Myanmar 1987-1990, and Algeria 1988-1992). As Katz specifically addresses, all
of these movements strove to create democratic reforms and all were greatly impacted by the
actions of the military. Like other academics, he DFNQRZOHGJHV³WKHNH\UROHSOD\HGE\WKH
military forces charged with defending the existing regime in determining the outcome of
DWWHPSWVDWUHYROXWLRQ´16 He also examines which factors have previously led forces to defect. In
the Philippines, Katz specifically cites resentment as President Marcos favored those close to
him over those qualified for lead official positions. In Russia, the military, ³UDWKHUWKDQDFt to
VDYHWKHV\VWHP«waitHGDQGZDWFKHGVHHNLQJWRMRLQWKHZLQQLQJVLGH´17 Lastly, Katz claims
the revolution in Serbia succeeded since the armed forces were just as eager to oust President
Milosevic as the rest of the Serbs; the command also determined at this time that military
personnel were unlikely to obey orders to fire upon unarmed protestors. Therefore, from Katz¶V
analysis, it can be determined that military loyalty is largely impacted E\WKHWURRSV¶ opinion of
the regime, their relation with the civilian population, and the power interests of the military.
15
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On the other hand, the revolution in Burma (Myanmar) failed because the military was
willing to follow the orders of the regime and ended up using force against the democratic
movement. The military opted to maintain loyalty since defection could not guarantee the same
level of power. Likewise, &KLQD¶VGHPRcratic movement did not experience military defection,
but in this case it was due to a lack of cohesion within tKH3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\therefore,
while not all units utilized force against the people, they also did not oppose others using force.
In Algeria, the movement was unsuccessful GXHWRWKHPLOLWDU\¶VKHVLWDQFH to accept a larger role
by the Islamic movement in politics and instead chose to prioritize its internal unity. Therefore,
like the successful democratic revolutions case studies, these unsuccessful examples demonstrate
that there are numerous factors WKDWJRLQWRPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO¶s decision to defect and that each
case has its own unique factors.
While Katz has done an adequate job at addressing the factors influencing the armed
forces to either continue to support the regime or turn against them, there is little other research
out there that focuses on movements in this manner. Although there are other articles and books
published on specific factors influencing revolutions, few take this reversed approach of focusing
on each revolution separately and then dissecting the incentives of the military within the
movement. My research serves to bring these two approaches together as I will examine each of
my case studies separately; however, while I will still take other factors into consideration, I
have a set group of independent variables that I will analyze in depth.

E thnic and Religious Divisions
Ethnic and religious divisions within military ranks also tend to complicate matters
during periods of unrest. This is because in authoritarian regimes it is often the minority who
holds the majority of the power and higher positions of authority in the armed forces. This
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division and structure is often what enables the regime to remain in power during conflict.
Theodore McLauchlin specifically examines this phenomenon of minority power in his article
³/R\DOW\6WUDWHJLHVDQG0LOLWDU\'HIHFWLRQLQ5HEHOOLRQ´. In this article KH³GLVWLQJXLVKHV
betZHHQWZRVWUDWHJLHVWRPDLQWDLQPLOLWDU\OR\DOW\LQµSUDHWRULDQ¶UHJLPHV²individual
incentives (reward and punishment) and a policy of ethnic preference in the armed
IRUFHV´18These strategies, when utilized successfully by regimes, serve to prevent a cascade of
defection during periods of rebellion. The concept of a cascade of defection refers to the idea that
³DVRSSRVLWLRQLQFUHDVHVWKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWDQ\JLYHQLQGLYLGXDOZLOOEHFRPHLQYROYHGDOVR
LQFUHDVHV´19 McLauchlin examines these two strategies by focusing on case studies and previous
VFKRODUV¶ZRUN. In his case studies he examines three particular rebellions in the Middle East
including the Muslim Brotherhood uprising of 1976-1982 in Syria, the unrest in Jordan during
1970, and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. From these movements he analyzes how
individual incentives and ethnic preferences were demonstrated in each movement and to what
effect.
Ultimately, McLauchlin adds to the discussion of the influence of ethnicity on defections
by concluding WKDW³IDYRULQJRQHHWKQLFJURXSLQWHUPVRIPLOLWDU\UHFUXLWPHQWIRUWKHVDNHRI
regime stability has two effects. First, it tends to increase the cohesion of ethnic out-groups, both
ZLWKLQWKHPLOLWDU\LWVHOIDQGLQVRFLHW\DWODUJH´DQG³VHFRQGVROidarity is likely to increase
DPRQJPHPEHUVRIDIDYRUHGJURXSDVZHOO´20These conclusions WKHQH[SODLQKRZ³DFDVFDGH
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might occur in the out-group, but it should not make in-JURXSPHPEHUVDQ\OLNHOLHUWRGHIHFW´21
To apply this to a specific case study for greater clarity, the out group in Syria would be the
Sunni majority and the in-group would be the more powerful minority: the Alawites. Despite
0F/DXFKOLQ¶VDUJXPHQWV, the article explains that ethnic divisions may still not be able to
completely deter defections, as ³GHIHFWLRQFDQRFFXUDFURVVHWKQLFOLQHVLIWKHVWDWH¶VGLVFRXUVH
DOORZVIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµOR\DO¶PHPEHUVRIDQHWKQLFRXW-JURXS´22 :KLOH0F/DXFKOLQ¶V
work contributes significantly to explaining how influential ethnic divisions are to military
defections, he fails to address the role of any external factors on ethnic divisions in regards to the
choices of military personnel. My research will strive to go beyond this single variable focus by
including other factors that influence military personnel to defect.
Sharon Erickson NepstadLQKHUDUWLFOH³1RQYLROHQW5HVLVWDQFHLQWKH$UDE6SULQJWKH
Critical Role of Military-2SSRVLWLRQ$OOLDQFHV´, also examines the influence of ethnic divisions
on revolutionary movements in addition to numerous other factors. In her argument she proposes
WKDW³LQQRQYLROHQWUHYROXWLRQDU\VWUXJJOHVLIPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHODUHFRPSULVHGRIGLIIHUHQW
ethnic or religious groups that have unequal power relations to the regime, the likelihood that the
military as a whoOHZLOOVLGHZLWKWKHRSSRVLWLRQPRYHPHQWLVORZ´23Conversely, in her book,

Nonviolent Revolutions, 1HSVWDGPDNHVWKHFODLPWKDW³GHIHFWLRQVRFFXUUHGLQVRPHLQVWDQFHV
EHFDXVHWURRSVVKDUHGDFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\ZLWKFLYLOUHVLVWHUV´VXFKDVDFRPPRQreligion.24 She
goes on to explain that a shared identity between the military and the civilian population as well
DVVLPLODUGHVLUHVIRUSROLWLFDOUHIRUPPDNHLW³GLIILFXOWIRUWURRSVWRYLHZFLYLOUHVLVWHUVDV
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XQUHDVRQDEOHUDGLFDOV´25 Like McLauchlin, Nepstad uses various case studies to examine her
four theoretical explanations; however, in regards to the variable of ethnic divisions Nepstad
focuses solely on Syria.
McLauchlin and Nepstad¶V hypotheses regarding ethnic and religious division address
the increased likelihood of defection when the military is better able to relate to the general
population in regards to ethnic or religious identity in comparison to their ability to relate to the
regime. These hypotheses can be furthered by comparing and analyzing movements that have
occurred in other nations that are ethnically divided. However, my research will attempt to
pinpoint why one movement suffered from this ethnic division, while it might not have played a
significant role in the other movement even in a multiethnic country.

T hreat of International Intervention
Despite international intervention or the threat of it in opposition to the current regime
being somewhat commonplace during periods of rebellion, there remains to be a minimal amount
of literature that addresses this topic even briefly despite these events having significant
implications on the outcome of movements. In addition, the amount of literature on international
intervention in regards to how it relates to military defections is almost nonexistent. Instead, the
vast majority of research surrounding international intervention focuses solely on if intervention
is justified and moral and if it is beneficial to the country it is done on the behalf of. Therefore, I
will add to the existing literature by examining international intervention and the threat of action
E\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\RQVROGLHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRGHIHFW. This variable will be of
particular interest in regards to the movements in Libya and Syria. Form this analysis I will
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determine if there is any promise of being able to generalize this effect to other revolutionary
movements.
In support of the argument that international intervention has significant implications on
the outcomes of revolutions, &KHQRZHWKDQG6WHSKDQFODLPWKDW³YLROHQWLQVXUJHQFLHVWHQGWR
succeed when they achieve external support´ 26. According to Chenoweth and Stephan, the
likelihood of success increases because support by an external actor can help legitimize the
violent insurJHQF\DQGWKHUHIRUHLQFUHDVHWKHPRYHPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRUHFUXLW While they do not
connect this statement to the role of the military during revolutions, it would appear that the
military would be more likely to act rationally and defect in attempt to preserve power if they
perceive a greater likelihood of rebel success due to the intervention or support of an external
actor. Chenoweth and Stephan also argue that while foreign governments are more likely to give
support for nonviolent movements through financial assistance, training, diplomatic recognition,
and sanctions, violent movements are more likely to receive direct material support. According
WRWKHLUUHVHDUFK³ZKHUHDVSHUFHQWRIWKHYLROHQWLQVXUJHQFLHVUHFHLYHGPDWHULDOVXSSRUWIURP
a foreign stDWHOHVVWKDQSHUFHQWRIQRQYLROHQWFDPSDLJQVGLGVR´27 They support this portion
of their argument through the use of quantitative analysis from the NAVCO (Nonviolent and
Violent Campaigns and Outcomes) data set as well as from an analysis of their case studies of
Iran, the Palestinian Territories, Burma, and the Philippines. One problem that I face in applying
&KHQRZHWKDQG6WHSKDQ¶VDUJXPHQWWRP\UHVHDUFKGHVLJQLVWKDW/LE\DDQG6\ULDERWKVWDUWHG
out as nonviolent movements that then developed into civil wars although Syria has maintained a
nonviolent component throughout. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to determine how
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Chenoweth and Stephan would categorize these movements, or if they would refrain from using
them as samples based on the NAVCO criteria. However, the general premise of their argument,
that international intervention is more likely to lead to the success of violent movements, can still
be applied to my project .This particular argument will be of specific interest during my analysis
of defections during the movement in Libya.

Impact of O rdering V iolent C rackdowns on Nonviolent Protests and the
O ccur rence of A rmed O pposition
The literature on the influence of nonviolence during revolutions is fairly extensive when
comparing this variable to the other independent variables in this project. However, nonviolence
is also a relatively new focus in the field despite its well documented history. The
aforementioned academics Gene Sharp, Erica Chenoweth, and Maria Stephan are also some of
the more well-known figures in the field of nonviolence in revolutions. Chenoweth and
6WHSKDQ¶V recent and much heralded book Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of

Nonviolent Conflict has begun to shed more light on this subject. However, in regards to their
ZRUN¶VXVHIXOQHVVWRP\UHVHDUFKWKH\WHQGWRH[SORUHRWKHUIDFWRUVmore in depth than military
defection as factors that lead to the success of nonviolent revolutions.
While not all of the material in Why Civil Resistance Works is relevant to my argument,
Chenoweth and Stephan do an extremely thorough job of researching the role of nonviolence in
popular uprisings using qualitative and quantitative research methods and an astounding number
of samples in their data set. Their work concludes that revolutions with a nonviolent focus are
significantly more likely to lead to victory for the rebel side and result in the replacement of an
authoritarian regime with a democratic government. They also fLQGWKDW³RQHFRPPRQVFHQDULR
leading to loyalty shifts is when the regime violently cracks down on a popular nonviolent
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FDPSDLJQZLWKPDVVFLYLOLDQSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´28 According to their work, a nonviolent conflict is
also less likely to devolve into civil war. Their methodology includes a combination of
quantitative analysis and case studies specifically focusing on nonviolent revolutions in Iran, the
Palestinian Territories, Burma and the Philippines.29
:KLOH&KHQRZHWKDQG6WHSKDQ¶VERRNWhy Civil Resistance Works¸ focuses
predominantly on the role of nonviolence as utilized by the civilian population, they also briefly
H[DPLQHLWVLQIOXHQFHRQWKHUHJLPH¶VSLOODUVRIVXSSRUW, particularly the relationship between the
armed forces and the regime. For example, they determine nonviolence to be successful in that
³HYLGHQFHRIGHIHFWLRQVZLWKLQWKHUDQNVRIWKHPLOLWDU\IRULQVWDQFHZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWWKH
regime no longer commands the cooperation and obedience of its most important pillar of
VXSSRUW´30 +RZHYHUWKH\GRQRW³LQFOXGHURXWLQHLQGLYLGXDOGHIHFWLRQV´LQWKHLUDQDO\VLV31
Instead, &KHQRZHWKDQG6WHSKDQIRFXVWKHLUUHVHDUFKRQ³ODUJH-scale, systematic breakdowns in
the exeFXWLRQRIDUHJLPH¶VRUGHUV´32 As cited by Mary Elizabeth King, Chenoweth and Stephan
GLGILQGWKDW³VXFFHVVIXOYLROHQWFDPSDLJQVVDZGHIHFWLRQVRFFXUDSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWRIWKH
time, while successful nonviolent campaigns experienced defections about 52 percent of the
WLPH´33
Like Chenoweth and Stephan, Katz discusses the significance of a regime issuing orders
for its military to crackdown on a nonviolent opposition. Katz, who focuses on case studies of
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successful democratic revolutions in the Philippines, Russia, and Serbia, explains that the
disloyalty that ultimately leads up to defection does not simultaneously occur throughout the
military,QVWHDG³GLVOR\DOW\RIWKHPLOLWDU\WRWKHUHJLPHZKLFKLVQHFHVVDU\IRUGHPRFUDWLF
revolutionaries to be successful, must manifest itself suddenly and surprisingly at the moment the
UHJLPHVHHNVWRHPSOR\LWWRFUXVKWKHGHPRFUDWLFRSSRVLWLRQ´34 This change of heart occurs
ZKHQ³WKHUHJLPHRUGHUVWKHYLROHQWVXSSUHVVLRQRILWVGHPRFUDWLFRSSRVLWLRQ´, which in turn
spurs action within the military as ³RQHRUPRUHNH\XQLWVGHIHFWWRWKHUHEHOVGHFODULQJWKH\ZLOO
ILJKWWRSURWHFWWKHP´,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLVGHIHFWLRQ³RWKHUVGHFODUHWKHLUµQHXWUDOLW\¶²i.e., their
XQZLOOLQJQHVVWRILJKWWKHLUIHOORZVROGLHUV´35 Both of these actions fall under my definition of
defection and serve to undermine morale LQWKHUHJLPH¶VPLOLWDU\DVOR\DOVROGLHUVUHDOL]HWKH\
may not be able to count on their fellow soldiers.
Dr. Stephen Zunes, a professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of
San Francisco DQGFKDLURIWKHXQLYHUVLW\¶V Middle Eastern Studies Program also focuses his
work on strategic nonviolent action. His DUWLFOH³Recognizing the Power of Nonviolent Action´,
analyzes the role of nonviolent action during revolutions. He separates his article into three
sections: why nonviolence works, nonviolent movements against U.S.-backed governments, and
nonviolent movements against governments opposed by the United States. In each section he
briefly references the influence of nonviolent action in multiple revolutions. Regarding military
GHIHFWLRQVKHVWDWHV³XQDUPHGPRYHPHQWVLQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIGHIHFWLRQVDQG
QRQFRRSHUDWLRQE\XQPRWLYDWHGSROLFHDQGPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO´36 Zunes explains that it is the
³WKHPRUDOSRZHURIQRQYLROHQFH´WKDWLVDEle to sway the perceptions and the support of the
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military. While this particle article does not go as in-depth as an academic journal since it was
LQWHQGHGIRUDJHQHUDODXGLHQFH=XQHV¶ZRUNLVVWLOOKLJKOy credible. His articles on the Arab
Spring Movement are primarily rooted in his widely acknowledged expertise on nonviolence,
which is based on an extensive case-study literature that is beyond my current scope of interest.
,QDQRWKHURQHRI=XQH¶VDUWLFOHVWLWOHG³$UDEUHYROXWLRQVDQGWKHSRZHURIQRQYLROHQWDFWLRQ´
Zunes further supports his claim that people power through the use of nonviolence is the most
successful tactic in revolutions. He backs this argument by stating, ³(YHQLIDJRYHUQPHQWKDVD
PRQRSRO\RIPLOLWDU\IRUFHDQGWKHVXSSRUWRIWKHZRUOG¶VRQHUHPDLQLQJVXSHUSRZHULWLVVWLOO
XOWLPDWHO\SRZHUOHVVLIWKHSHRSOHUHIXVHWRUHFRJQL]HLWVDXWKRULW\´37Zunes uses a variety of
evidence to demonstrate the successfulness of nonviolence including the examination of
previously successful movements in the Middle East, a 2005 study by the Freedom House titled
³+RZ)UHHGRP,V:RQ)URP&LYLF5HVLVWDQFHWR'XUDEOH'HPRFUDF\´, and Chenoweth and
6WHSKDQ¶VERRNWhy Civil Resistance Works. While Zunes specifically addresses the Arab Spring
in his article, I will contribute to this research by taking a more in depth look at the situations in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria in regards to how nonviolence has influenced defections by military
personnel.
As previously stated, Nepstad examines numerous variables in her article examining the
Arab Spring. While I have already discussed her analysis of ethnic divisions, another focus of
her work is the effect of armed opposition. She proposeVWKDW³LQQRQYLROHQWUHYROXWLRQDU\
struggles, when military defectors take up armed struggle against the state, the nonviolent aspect
RIWKHVWUXJJOHZLOOGLVVLSDWHDQGWKHQDWLRQZLOOOLNHO\VOLGHLQWRFLYLOZDU´38 In regards to this
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variable her case study of choice is the 2011 movement in Libya. However, Nepstad also
suggests that the ongoing situation in Syria would likely turn into a civil war. Since this article
was published the situation in Syria has devolved from a primarily nonviolent movement into a
civil war. While the nonviolent movement in Syria persists, the violence has greatly
overshadowed it. This evidence thus suggests WKDW1HSVWDG¶VK\SRWKHVLVFRQFHUQLQJPLOLWDU\
defectors who take up arms against the regime has some merit. In her book, Nonviolent

Revolutions, Nepstad examines nonviolent movements against socialist regimes, military
regimes, and personal dictators by using China, East Germany, Panama, Chile, Kenya, and the
Philippines as case studies. In this book Nepstad adds that violence by the general population
GHFUHDVHVWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIGHIHFWLRQDVVROGLHUV³IHDUUHWDOLDWLRQDWWKHKDQGVRIDKRVWLOH
FURZG´39
Zunes reiterates 1HSVWDG¶VDUJXPHQWDGGLQJWKDW, ³DUPHGUHYROWVOHJLWLPL]HWKHUROHRIWKH
JRYHUQPHQW¶VFRHUFLYHDSSDUDWXVHQKDQFLQJLWVVHOI-SHUFHSWLRQDVWKHSURWHFWRURIVRFLHW\´40
Therefore, military defections, especially those in the form of large scale defections, are less
likely to occur when the government faces an armed rebellion because repression is then seen as
justifiable. I will specifically H[DPLQHWKHRQJRLQJVLWXDWLRQLQ6\ULDDV$VVDG¶VUHJLPHKDV
brutally cracked down on the Free Syrian Army and both sides have resorted to violence. I will
also examine the situations in Syria and Libya to see if this hypothesis can be further
generalized. In addition this project will inspect how armed rebellion was adverted in Egypt.
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The Revolutions and Their Buildups: A Brief Look at Case Studies
This section will take a closer look at the conditions that led up to each of the
revolutions. In addition, the general events of the revolutions will be examined as well as how
events in Egypt and Libya were resolved and where the civil war in Syria stands today. After the
general information on each of my case studies has been presented, I will explore how each
hypothesis relates to each case study in the following section.

Egypt
*HQHUDO%DFNJURXQGRQ0XEDUDN¶V5HJLPH
Hosni Mubarak, prior to taking over the office of the president served as the Vice
President of Egypt as well as a commander in the Egyptian Air Force. He succeeded Anwar Al6DGDWDVSUHVLGHQWLQDIWHU6DGDW¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQE\(J\SWLDQ,VODPLVWH[WUHPLVWV41
Mubarak was reelected WRILYHWHUPVDVSUHVLGHQWVHUYLQJDOPRVWWKLUW\\HDUVLQ(J\SW¶V
executive office. However, the legitimacy of these presidential elections had been greatly
FRQWHVWHGRYHUWKH\HDUV(YHQDIWHU0XEDUDN¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWLQWKDW³KHQFHIRUWK(J\SW¶V
presidential elections would be multi-SDUW\ZLWKRWKHUFDQGLGDWHVDOORZHGWRUXQIRUWKHRIILFH´
KLVRSSRQHQWVZHUHGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJRQO\³WRNHQRSSRVLWLRQ´42 &ODLPVWKDWWKHUHZDV³OLPLWHG
access to polling places, stuffed ballot boxes, voter intimidation and the pre-election arrest of
VRPH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGPHPEHUV´GXULQJWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQIXUWKHUHGWKLV
EHOLHIWKDW0XEDUDN¶VUHHOHFWLRQVKDGEHHQIL[HGRYHUWKH\HDUV43 This apparent political
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corruption resulted in some discontent within the nation; however, more factors would have to
come into play before large scale action was taken by the people of Egypt.
,QDGGLWLRQWRDOOHJDWLRQVRIIL[HGHOHFWLRQV0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHDOVRKDGDORQJKLVWRU\RI
repression before the 2011 revolution. Mostly in response to Islamic fundamentalists such the
umbrella organization al-Gamaa al-Islamiya who wished to build an Egyptian state based on the
ODZVRI,VODPWKHUHJLPHGHFODUHGWKDWWKHGHDWKSHQDOW\PD\EHLPSRVHGIRU³DQWLVWDWH
WHUURULVP´44 DurinJ0XEDUDN¶VUXOHWKHUHJLPHDOVRIUHTXHQWO\GHFODUHGH[WHQGHGVWDWHVRI
emergency. It was during these periods that human rights were routinely ignored as indefinite
detentions without charges were relatively common practice and suspects were often tortured. To
JDLQLQIRUPDWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWDWWLPHVDOVRHQJDJHGLQWKHPLVWUHDWPHQWRIVXVSHFWV¶
relatives. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press were also greatly constricted under
0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPH2QHH[DPSOHRIWKLVZDVDODZSDVVHGLQZKLFKJDYe the government
WKHDXWKRULW\WRILQHDQGSRWHQWLDOO\MDLOMRXUQDOLVWVIRUSXEOLVKLQJDUWLFOHVFRQVLGHUHG³KDUPIXOWR
WKHVWDWH´45
In regards to civil-military relations both before and even after the revolution in Egypt,
academic Derek Lutterbeck explaiQHGWKDWWKH(J\SWLDQDUPHGIRUFHV³FDQEHGHVFULEHGDVD
SURIHVVLRQDODQGODUJHO\PHULWRFUDWLFIRUFH´46 According to opinion polls, it is the Egyptian
armed forces that are considered to be the most respectable official institution in the nation and
the one most committed to pursuing objectives that are aligned with the national interest.
+RZHYHUWKHPLOLWDU\GXULQJ0XEDUDN¶VUXOHKDVDOVRSOD\HGDGRPLQDQWUROHLQERWKWKHSROLWLFDO
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DQGHFRQRPLFVSKHUHVRIWKHQDWLRQWKXVLQFUHDVLQJWKHDUPHGIRUFHV¶ORyalty to the regime.
'HVSLWHSUHYLRXVDWWHPSWVE\WKHUHJLPHWR³OLPLWWKHSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHRIWKHDUP\DQGWR
UHIRFXVLWPRUHVWURQJO\RQLWVSXUHO\PLOLWDU\WDVNV´WKHDUPHGIRUFHVPDLQWDLQHGVWURQJ
connections with the regime politically up until the uprising. 47 Regardless of these attempts to
FRQVWULFWWKHLUSRZHUDQGLQIOXHQFHWKHPLOLWDU\ZDVDQGFRQWLQXHVWREHFRQVLGHUHGWKH³NH\
SLOODUZLWKLQWKH(J\SWLDQSROLWLFDOV\VWHP´ 48 The relationship between military and regime is
likely this strong since all Egyptian presidents from the overthrow of the monarchy through
Mubarak had previously served as members of the armed forces.

The Egyptian Revolution
January 25, 2011 officially marked the start RI(J\SW¶VUHYROXWLRQDVLWZDVWKHILUVWGD\
of mass protests throughout urban areas, particularly Cairo.49 January 25th was selected for its
specific significance because it has traditionally been heralded as Police Day. This holiday,
which was supposed to celebrate the role of the Egyptian police, had also been ridiculed by other
Egyptian movements in the past, particularly the April 6th Youth Movement as many saw the
state police as being exceedingly corrupt.50 +DYLQJVWXGLHGSUHYLRXVPRYHPHQWVVXFKDV6HUELD¶V
youth movement Otpor!, the April 6th Movement was well versed in how to utilize nonviolent
tactics and can be attributed with encouraging the Egyptian Revolution to remain nonviolent.51
These initial protests of 2011 were also partially inspired by the successful Jasmine Revolution
in Tunisia which had started only weeks earlier and resulted in Tunisian President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali fleeing the country. The people of Egypt were motivated to protest particularly
47
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LQUHVSRQVHWRWKHUHJLPH¶V³GHWHULRUDWLQJDELOLW\WRSURYLGHEDVLFVHUYLFHVDQGVHeming
LQGLIIHUHQFHWRZLGHVSUHDGXQHPSOR\PHQWDQGSRYHUW\´DVZHOODVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VZLGHVSUHDG
corruption.52 The size and momentum of the movement only increased after January 25th, with
activists from the Coalition of January 25 Youth presenting a serieVRIGHPDQGVRI0XEDUDN¶V
UHJLPHLQFOXGLQJ³WKHUHVLJQDWLRQRI0XEDUDNWKHOLIWLQJRIWKHVWDWHRIHPHUJHQF\WKHUHOHDVHRI
all political prisoners, the dissolution of parliament, the appointment of a government of
independent technocrats, the drafting of a new constitution, and the punishment of those
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUYLROHQFHDJDLQVWWKHSURWHVWRUV´53
On February 11th after eighteen days of mass protest, the Egyptian Revolution came to a
FRQFOXVLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\HOLWHUHDOL]LQJWKDW³Wying their future to a crippled regime might in the
end destroy their reputation and undermine their ability to maintDLQWKHLUSRVLWLRQRISULYLOHJH´
pressured Mubarak to abdicate the office of president. 54 Mubarak realizing he was facing
international condemnation and had lost favor with both the people of Egypt and the military as
resigned as president of Egypt. This resignation served to effectively hand over executive powers
to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.55 With this speedy transition Egypt became
heralded as the greatest success story of the Arab Spring Movement, as this overwhelmingly
nonviolent movement was not only effective and efficient but also thoroughly covered by the
Western media.
It is also important to note at this time that while unrest in Egypt has become prevalent
IURPWLPHWRWLPHVLQFH0XEDUDN¶VRXVWLQJWKLVSURMHFWVHUYHVWRVROHO\IRFXVRQWKHSHULRGRI
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-DQXDU\ZKHQPDMRUSURWHVWVEHJDQXSXQWLO0XEDUDN¶VUHVLJQDWLRQRQ)HEUXDU\
2011. Strains in civil-military and regime-military relationships since then are currently outside
my scope of focus.

L ibya
*HQHUDO%DFNJURXQGRQ*DGGDIL¶V5XOH
In September of 1969 a military coup consisting of young army officers led by Captain
Muammar Gaddafi disposed of Libyan King Idris. This coup would become known as the Free
Officers Movement.56 Gaddafi then took over as leader of Libya, transforming the government
IURPWKDWRIDPRQDUFK\WRDVLQJOHSDUW\VWDWHRUDVLWKDVRIILFLDOO\EHHQODEHOHG³DJamahiriya
PHDQLQJ³VWDWHEHORQJLQJWRWKHSHRSOH´57 This tumultuous change would signify the start of
*DGDIIL¶VWKLUW\WZR\HDUUXOHDVWKHOHDGHURI/LE\D
/LE\D¶VFLYLO-PLOLWDU\UHODWLRQVGXULQJ*DGGDIL¶VUXOHZHUHUDWKHUXQLTXHLQFRPSDULVRQWR
those in Syria and Egypt. Leading up to the coXQWU\¶VFROODSVHLQWRFLYLOZDUWKHUHZDVD
GLVWLQFW³ODFNRILQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQDQGWKHOHYHORISDWULPRQLDOLVPDQGSROLWLFL]DWLRQRIWKH
VHFXULW\DSSDUDWXVZDVDUJXDEO\QRZKHUHKLJKHUWKDQLQ/LE\D´58 This lack of institutionalism
in the armed foUFHVZDVVLPLODUWR*DGGDIL¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQRIRWKHUVWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQV$VZHOODV
lacking centralization, Gaddafi made sure state sponsored organizations were loyal to him by
DSSRLQWLQJWKRVHKHWUXVWHGWRSRVLWLRQVRIDXWKRULW\7KLVZDVHYLGHQWDV³WKHFRXQWU\¶VPRVW
LPSRUWDQWVHFXULW\IRUFHV>ZHUH@EDVHGSULPDULO\RQWULEDODQGIDPLO\WLHVWR*DGGDILKLPVHOI´59
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The armed forces were also divided into multiple groups. The first consisted of the traditional
army whose job was to secure Libya from external threats and the second consisted of a wide
variety of agencies whose primary mission was to protect the regime and the ideology behind it.
7KHVHPHDVXUHVDQGIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIWKH/LE\DQPLOLWDU\ZHUHRUGHUHGE\*DGGDIL³LQKLVHIIRUW
to prevent the emergence of any alternative political power base capable of challenging his
UHJLPH´60

The Libyan Civil War
While the Arab Spring Movement began in the Middle East and Northern Africa as a
primarily peaceful and internally focused movement, Libya would largely change this
perception. Although the Libyan revolution began on February 15, 2011 with nonviolent protest
activity, the movement would devolve into a violent campaign only four days later.61 In
comparison to the movement in Egypt, which remained overwhelmiQJO\QRQYLROHQW/LE\D¶V
PRYHPHQWZRXOG³VRRQEHFRPHDQDOO-out succession²or multiple separate secessions²from a
IDLOHGVWDWH´62 According to Anderson, this difference between the situations in Egypt and Libya
was primarily due to what the country lacked, LQFOXGLQJ³QRV\VWHPRISROLWLFDODOOLDQFHV
QHWZRUNRIHFRQRPLFDVVRFLDWLRQVRUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQVRIDQ\NLQG´63 +RZHYHU/LE\D¶V
SHRSOHZHUHXQLWHGLQWKHLUGDLO\VWUXJJOHVDQGJULHYDQFHVZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW0RVWRI/LE\D¶V
general population haGILQDOO\EHFRPHIHGXSZLWK³\HDUVRIDUWLILFLDOO\LQGXFHGVFDUFLW\LQ
HYHU\WKLQJIURPVLPSOHFRQVXPHUJRRGVWREDVLFPHGLFDOFDUH´DVZHOODVZLGHVSUHDGFRUUXSWLRQ
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LQWKHUHJLPHDQG*DGGDIL¶VFRQVROLGDWLRQRISRZHUEDVHGSULPDULO\RQFODQDQGNLQVKLS64 This
IDYRULWLVPOLNHO\OHGWRDQLQFUHDVHLQIDFWLRQVEHWZHHQ/LE\D¶VWURRSV
According to interviews with Libyan soldiers who were captured by rebel forces during
WKHFRQIOLFW*DGGDIL¶VDUP\DQGPLOLWLDVZHUH³XQGHUPLQHGE\VHOI-serving officers, strained
ORJLVWLFVDQGXQLWVKDVWLO\UHLQIRUFHGZLWKXQWUDLQHGFDGHWV´65 Several also talked about how
they were originally unaware that they were fighting against their fellow Libyans. Instead one
captured solider described how his officers had insisted that thH\ZHUHZRUNLQJWR³SXWGRZQD
foreign-LQVSLUHGMLKDG´66 )RUWKRVHZKRFKRVHWRRSSRVHWKHUHJLPH¶VRUGHUVRXWULJKWWKH
FRQVHTXHQFHVZHUHRIWHQVHYHUH2QHUHSRUWE\WKH$VVRFLDWHG3UHVVFODLPVWKDW³5HEHOVDIWHU
overrunning government strongholds in the east, described finding government soldiers bound
DQGVKRWWKURXJKWKHKHDGDSSDUHQWO\IRUGLVREH\LQJRUGHUV´67 In the same article a former
/LE\DQDUP\RIILFHUVWDWHGWKDW³6RPHRIRXUFROOHDJXHVMXVWFRXOGQ¶WKDQGOHLWDQ\PRUHDQG
turned their weapons oQWKHPVHOYHV´LQRUGHUWRHVFDSHWKHPDVVDFUH68
On March 5th 2011 after almost a month of fighting, the rebel National Transitional
Council (NTC) in Benghazi proclaimed LWVHOIDV/LE\D¶V sole representative. However, it was not
until October 20th 2011 that Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed by NTC fighters in his
hometown of Sirte. Three days later an NTC official announced the liberation of the nation
VWDWLQJ³:HGHFODUHWRWKHZKROHZRUOGWKDWZHKDYHOLEHUDWHGRXUEHORYHGFRXQWU\ZLWKLWV
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cities, villages, hill-tops, mountains, deserts and skies,"69 By October 23rd, 2011 Abdul Raheem
al-Keeb was elected as the new interim prime minister of Libya.

Syria
*HQHUDO%DFNJURXQGRQ$VVDG¶V5HJLPH
Bashar al-Assad was elected unopposed as the president of Syria in 2000. He succeeded
his father Hafez al-$VVDGZKRVHUYHGDV6\ULD¶VSUHVLGHQWIRUQHDUO\WKUHHGHFDGHVXSXQWLOKLV
death. Bashar al-$VVDGIROORZHGKLVIDWKHU¶VIRRWVWHSVE\EHFRPLQJSUHVLGHQWDQGE\WDNLQJRYHU
the roles of leader of the armed IRUFHVDQGWKH%D¶aWK5HJLRQDO&RPPDQGWKH%D¶ath being
6\ULD¶VSULPDU\SROLWLFDOSDUW\7KH6\ULDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOVRJUDQWVWKHSUHVLGHQWWKHDELOLW\WR
decide and execute policies and the right to appoint all government officials. The Syrian
executive office also enjoys unlimited emergency powers. Overall, Bashar al-$VVDG¶VSROLFLHV
up until the rebellion, have been considered to be more moderate than those of his father.70

The Syrian Conflict
The unrest in Syria, much like the conflicts in Egypt and Libya, primarily stemmed from
high unemployment rates, poor living standards, and decades of emergency rule which restricted
FLWL]HQ¶VSROLWLFDOIUHHGRPVDQGIUHTXHQWO\UHVXOWHGLQKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHV71 /LNH/LE\D6\ULD¶V
revolution began quite peacefully; however, the revolution has since turned into a drawn out
bloody struggle as both the Assad regime and the opposition have resorted to large scale
YLROHQFH$FFRUGLQJWR-RQ/HH$QGHUVRQLQKLVDUWLFOH³7KH:DU:LWKLQ´LWZDV³RQO\DIWHUWKe
police shot at demonstrators and tortured to death a group of adolescent protesters, returning
69

"Timeline: Libya's civil war Key moments in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and the transition to the new
government." The Guardian , November 19, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libyacivil-war (accessed April 11, 2013).
70
William J. Spencer, Global Studies: The Middle East, Twelfth Edition , (New York: McGraw-Hill , 2009), chap.
Syria: 169-176.
71
Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition
Alliances," Swiss Political Science Review. 17. no. 4 (2011): 487.

43

WKHLUERGLHVWRWKHLUIDPLOLHVJRXJHGZLWKNQLYHVDQGLQDWOHDVWRQHFDVHFDVWUDWHG´WKDWWKH
opposition turned violent against the regime.72 These adolescent protestors, which consisted of a
group of schoolboys ranging from ten to fifteen in age, had been detained on March 6, 2011 for
VSUD\SDLQWLQJ³$V6KDDE<RU-HHG(VNDDWHOQL]DP´ZKLFKKDGEHHQDVORJDQRIWKHXSULVLQJVLQ
Egypt and Tunisia. 73 TranslateGWR(QJOLVKWKLVSKUDVHPHDQV³7KHSHRSOHZDQWWRWRSSOHWKH
UHJLPH´74 The demonstrators whom the police shot at, killing at least four, had been members of
WKHER\V¶IDPLOLHVDVZHOODVORFDOFOHULFVZKRZHUHSURWHVWLQJWKHER\V¶LQKXPDQHGHWDLQPHQW
and treatment. 9LROHQFHVLQFHWKHPRYHPHQW¶VRXWEUHDNKDVRQO\ continued to escalate with a
UHSRUWIURP%%&RQ$SULOSODFLQJWKHGHDWKWROODW³DWOHDVWSHRSOH´75
6\ULDKDVDSWO\EHHQGHVFULEHGDV³RQHRIWKHPRVWFRXS-SURQHVWDWHVRQHDUWK´Postly
due to its history surrounding these ethnic tensions.76 Therefore, in order to ensure stability
within the regime, both of the Assads implemented and continue to implement ethnic preference
VWUDWHJLHVZLWKLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VJRYHUQPHQWDQGLWVDUPHGIRUFes. As explained by McLauchlin
during his analysis of the loyalty strategies present in Syria only a year before the conflict began,
this strategy is threefold in how it works,
First and most obvious, most of the senior command of the military was Alawi, such that
E\WKHWLPHRI$VDG¶VGHDWKRYHUSHUFHQWRIJHQHUDO-rank officers were Alawis.
Second, however, Sunnis were still well represented in the rank and file. This
corresponds to some concessions by Asad to Sunnis, such as their prominence within
paUWVRIWKH%D¶WKSDUW\DQGEXUHDXFUDWLFKLHUDUFK\7KLUGKRZHYHUWKHFUXFLDOHWKQLF
strategy for regime maintenance was the creation of elite regime-defending unites
peopled strongly by Alawis.77
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While this division is very apparent in Syria today, its roots go much further back,
primarily stemming from the period after WWI during which Syria and its government were
XQGHUWKHKHDY\LQIOXHQFHRI)UDQFH$FFRUGLQJWR)LOGLVLQKLVH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH³5RRWVRI
Alawite-6XQQL5LYDOU\LQ6\ULD´³WKe French administration consciously neglected to train an
efficient and dedicated elite and quietly aggravated relations between the Sunni Arab majority
DQGPLQRULWLHV´78 This was done in order to constrain the Syrian independence movement and
Arab nationalism.
While defection during the Arab Spring Movement has been most notable in Syria due to
its high frequency and occurrence across the ranks, there have also been more nontraditional
types of defection which have further crippled the regime. As The New York Times reported in
-XO\RI³3UHVLGHQW$VVDG¶VELJJHUPLOLWDU\FKDOOHQJHLVWKHVZHOOLQJQXPEHURIVLOHQW
objectors²soldiers of all ranks lacking the means to flee, or the interest, but no longer
cooperating with the government. Instead of responding to the call to duty, they are staying
KRPHDEDQGRQLQJWKHLUSRVWV´79 With the chaos of the conflict and nontraditional types of
defection, it is presently impossible to determine just how widespread defections are in Syria.
Despite the prevalence of defection in Syria and the United States Department of State stating
WKDW6\ULD¶VPLOLWDU\LVJURZLQJZHDN, independent military analysts ZDUQWKDW$VVDG¶VPLOLWDU\LV
³VWLOl FDSDEOHRIKDQGOLQJWKHWKUHDWVWKDWWKH\¶UHGHDOLQJZLWKDQGWKH\¶YHEHHQUHDFhing deeper
and deeper and deeper into their armory´80
One similarity the ongoing situation in Syria shares with the 2011 civil war in Libya is
VROGLHUV¶UHSRUWVWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHLUFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUVKDYHPLVOHGWKHPLQUHJDUGV
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to the true aim RIWKHLUPLVVLRQ7RNHHSVROGLHUVFRPPLWWHG$VVDG¶VUHJLPHKDVLQIRUPHGWKHP
that they are fighting foreign sponsored terrorism and not their fellow Syrians. According to
1HSVWDGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPWKDWWKHRSSRVLWLRQLVFRPSRVHGRIWHUURULVWVLVPXch more
believable to the troops if the opposition forces use violence.81 In an interview with The Wall

Street Journal, a 21 year old ex-Syrian army intelligence officer turned defector reported that
³79VZHUHUHPRYHGDQGKLVFRPPDQGHUVWROGKLPDQGKLVFROleagues they were fighting against
terrorists aligned with the U.S. and Israel who were plotting to overthrow President Bashar al$VVDG´82 :KHQKHUHWXUQHGKRPHDQGUHDOL]HGLWZDVQ¶WWHUURULVWVKHZDVILJKWLQJEXWUDWKHUKLV
fellow countrymen, he left the service. However, in this case, the soldier abstained from joining
the rebel forces.
7KHFRQIOLFW¶VH[WHQGHGGXUDWLRQKDVDOVRSURYHGSUREOHPDWLFIRUWKHRSSRVLWLRQDVWKH
amount of soldiers defecting has greatly diminished and there has been fear that those who wish
to defect have already done so. In an October 2012 New York Times article it was reported that
RSSRVLWLRQFRPPDQGHUVKDYHHYHQ³UHVRUWHGWRPRUHGHVSHUDWHPHDVXUHVFDMROLQJGXSLQJ
threatening and even drugging and kidnapping military men to get them to change sides, or at
OHDVWVWD\RXWRIWKHILJKW´83 Not only has the significant duration of the uprising taken a toll on
WKHRSSRVLWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRUHFUXLWGHIHFWRUVEXW$VVDG¶VFKDQJHRIVWUDWHJ\KDVDOVRSRVHGD
challenge to the opposition. By focusing on attacks from a distance through artillery and air
strikes, the regime has been able to distance their remaining forces from interacting with the
rebels and the public who could spur loyal soldiers to defect. Joseph Holiday, a researcher at the
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Institute for the Study of War in Washington and specialist on the Syrian conflict, also points out
WKDW$VVDGKDVXVHGWKHVWUDWHJ\³RI teaming units made up of conscripts with more professional,
better trained troops.´84 In turn the opposition has also changed strategies as it has begun to
acknowledge that violence is undermining popular support for their side. They have made this
shift by blaming the government for staging more extreme attacks, although the opposition also
continues to utilize violence.85
While my case studies have demonstrated that the military elites are primarily motivated
by the side that is able to ensure their power status, they appear to be somewhat concerned with
the morality of the conflict as well. Lt. General Abdulaziz al-Shala, who has been one of the
highest ranking defectors in the Syrian conflict so far, stated that he withdrew his support for the
UHJLPHDV³WKHDUP\IDLOHGWRSURWHFW6\ULDQV´86 In a video statement released by Abdualziz he
further explaineGWKDWKLVGHIHFWLRQZDVGXHWRWKHPLOLWDU\¶V³GHYLDWLRQIURPLWVIXQGDPHQWDO
PLVVLRQWRSURWHFWWKHQDWLRQDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWRJDQJVRIPXUGHUDQGGHVWUXFWLRQ´87 This
statement reiterates that defection in Syria has occurred across ranks with different incentives
and that these incentives do not always fit under my three independent variables or align with my
original hypotheses. Soldiers have also taken varying stances on the conflict in Syria upon
defecting as some have joined the opposition while others have been silent objectors that refuse
to carry out regime orders.
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Analysis of Major F indings
This section explores relevant case study information as it correlates with each of my
three hypotheses. After each hypothesis is explained by case study I will present my major
findings. I will particularly address whether or not my case studies lived up to my original
expectations or if not, expand to explain why this might be so.

H 1- Military personnel are more likely to defect if the opposition force is of the same ethnic or
religious makeup as them and if the majority of the high ranking officials within the government
come from a different ethnic or religious group.

Egypt- T he Role of E thnic and Religious Divisions
(WKQLFDOO\(J\SWGXULQJ0XEDUDN¶VUXOHFRQVLVWHGRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\(DVWHUQ
Hamitic (Egyptian, Bedouin, Arab, and Nubian) and 1% other.88 As previously explored in
UHJDUGVWR0XEDUDN¶VGLIILFXOW\ZLWK,VODPLFIXQGDPHQWDOLVPWKHRQO\UHDOPDMRUVSOLWFXOWXUDOO\
in Egypt stemmed from its religious divide. According to Global Studies: The Middle East,
Egypt at this time was approximately 94% Muslim (mostly Sunni) and 6% Coptic Christian and
others.89 These religious minorities often found themselves as targets of extremist attacks
particularly during the 1990s as they were particularly vulnerable. Although these extremist
groups chose to specifically target religious minorities, they also targeted tourists, suggesting that
WKHVHH[WUHPLVWV¶PRWLYHVPD\EHOHVVGULYHQE\WKHUHOLJLRXVGLYLGHDQGPRUHE\WKHLUGHVLUHWR
gain attention in the region. These attacks also greatly subsided as Egypt put stricter security
measures into operation to contain this violence by extremists. 90
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Despite previous significant conflict within the country over Islamic fundamentalism
GXULQJ0XEDUDN¶VUXOHHWKQLFDQGUHOLJLRXVGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHFRXQWU\GLGQRWseem to present a
major obstacle during the revolution. Based on a lack of citation in interviews with soldiers and
newspaper articles, religious and ethnic differences did not appear to have any significant
influence over the decision of individuals in the military to defect, nor the ultimate decision of
the generals to persuade Mubarak to hand power to a council compromised of military elite.
Instead most sources have determined that the Egyptian military elite acted primarily on power
DQGHFRQRPLFLQFHQWLYHV$V$QGHUVRQUHSRUWHGLQKHUDUWLFOH³'HP\VWLI\LQJWKH$UDE6SULQJ´
³DVLW>WKH(J\SWLDQ$UPHG)RUFHV@DVVXPHGFRQWURORI(J\SWDIWHU0XEDUDN¶VGRZQIDOOWKH
army revealed its enormous influence in EgySWLDQVRFLHW\´91 :KLOH0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHKDG
UHZDUGHGWKHPLOLWDU\HOLWHVKDQGVRPHO\³ZLWKJURZLQJHFRQRPLFLQYROYHPHQWLQHYHU\WKLQJ
from housewares and military-JHDUSURGXFWLRQWRIDUPLQJDQGWRXULVP´DQGSURFHHGVIURPWKHVH
VHFWRUVJRLQJ³VWUDLJKWWRthHPLOLWDU\¶VFRIIHUVDQGLVGLVEXUVHGZLWKRXWVWDWHRYHUVLJKW´, the
military HOLWHVIHOWWKHLURYHUDOOVWDWXVZDVWKUHDWHQHGDQG³ULVLQJYLROHQFHZRXOGRQO\KXUWWKH
PLOLWDU\¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGLQIOXHQFH´92 Therefore, it was better to sever ties with Mubarak¶V
UHJLPHDQGHQVXUHWKHPLOLWDU\¶VIXWXUHRILQIOXHQFLQJ(J\SWLDQVRFLHW\
Instead of religion acting as a divisive factor in the revolution, the iconic image of
Christians protecting Muslim protestors during prayer and Muslims protecting Christians
celebrating Mass in Tahrir Square Cairo seemed to set the tone for protests. As Reverend Ihab alKharat informed the protestors in a sermon he gave in Tahrir Square during the midst of the
conflict³:HZLOONHHSSURWHVWLQJXQWLOWKHIDOORIWKHW\UDQQ\´DQG³In the name of Jesus and
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0XKDPPHGZHXQLI\RXUUDQNV´93 However, despite this portrayal of a religiously unified
movement, there were significant misgivings from both the people of Egypt and the international
community about the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood. While the group ended up not
being a major deciding factor during the revolution, there was initial concern as to whether or not
their presence would hinder the protests and fragment the support for the movement. There was
also apprehension in regards to the role the Muslim Brotherhood may play politically in the new
JRYHUQPHQWXSRQ0XEDUDN¶VUHPRYDOIURPSRZHU

L ibya- T he Role of E thnic and Religious Divisions
$FFRUGLQJWR:LOOLDP-6SHQFHU¶V³7KH0LGGOH(DVW´/LE\DHWKQLFDOO\FRQVLVWVRI97%
Berber and Arab, and 3% other. Religiously the nation is divided into 97% Sunni Muslims, and
3% other.94 Most of the division within the nation comes from its widespread and historically
engrained clan system based on region, kinship, and tribe. AccordiQJWR$QGHUVRQ³HYHU\
QDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQLQFOXGLQJWKHPLOLWDU\LVGLYLGHGE\WKHFOHDYDJHVRINLQVKLSDQGUHJLRQ´95
American scholar and historian Juan Cole also pointed out LQKLVEORJSRVWRQWKH³5HYROXWLRQDU\
6LWXDWLRQLQ/LE\D´that it was largeO\WKURXJK³FXOWLYDWLQJWULEDOOR\DOWLHV´WKDW*DGGDIL
remained in power as long as he did.96 For example, the when the Libyan tribes of Warfala and
Tuareg announced their defection and decision to support the opposition they brought 1.5million
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of their extended kin with them.97 However, it is uncertain how many of these 1.5 million
Libyans were members of the Libyan armed forces and if they also participated in this loyalty
shift.

Syria- T he Role of E thnic and Religious Divisions
Leading up to the Syrian FRQIOLFWWKHFRXQWU\¶VHWKQLFPDNHXSZDVDSSUR[LPDWHO\
Arab, 9.7% Kurds, and 2.3% Armenian and other Christians. Religious differences combined
with ethnic tensions have also had significant implications on how the regime is structured as,
³6\ULDQSROLtical instability stems from the division of the population into separate ethnic and
UHOLJLRXVJURXSV´98 While 75% of the nation is Sunni Muslim, 16% are Alawite, Druze and other
Muslim sects, and the remaining 10% Christian and Jewish, it continues to be the Alawite
minority that controls most positions of authority in the government including not only the office
of the president, but also many of the elite positions in the armed forced, police, and intelligent
services.
Despite countless accounts by reliable sources stating the role of secularism as a large
part of the Syrian revolution now turned civil war, this supposed fact was dismissed in a CNN
interview with Syrian Colonel Abdalhamid Zakaria. Colonel Zakaria is a doctor and defector of
the Syrian army who has now chosen to fight on the side of the Free Syrian Army. Zakaria
FODLPHGWKDWUHSRUWVDERXWVHFXODUGLYLVLRQLQ6\ULD³ZHUHHQFRXUDJHGLIQRWFUHDWHGE\WKH
$VVDG5HJLPH´DQGWKDW³$VVDGDOZD\VWULHGWRFRQYLQFHWKHZRUOGWKDWZHKDYHDVHFWDrian
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ZDU´99 According to the former Colonel, this deception by President Assad has been in attempt
to convince Syrians and the international community that he is the only one who can keep these
religious sects safe. While this interview with Colonel Zakaria casts some doubt over the extent
WKDWWKHVHFXODUGLYLVLRQLQ6\ULDKDVSOD\HGLQVKDSLQJ6\ULD¶VUHYROXWLRQ and whether or not it
has divided the military, his statement does not eliminate the fact there is a significant religious
divide in Syria that has historically been at the root of Syrian unrest. With so much other
information supporting the idea that the religious divide has played a major role particularly in
determining the loyalty of the armed forces, I feel it would be unwise to completely disregard its
possible implications based on the report of one individual. For example, a report on the Waging

Nonviolence blog by nonviolence scholar and professor of peace and conflict studies Mary
Elizabeth King contradicts Zakaria by highlighting the fact that most defectors have been Sunni
Muslims whereas most of the Alawite minority has remained loyal to the Assad regime.100 In
addition, according to a New York Times DUWLFOH³RIWKH\RXQJPHQH[SHFWHGWRVKRZXS
for their mandatory military service this year²most of them Sunnis²experts said that virtually
QRQHKDYHUHVSRQGHG´101 $VDIRUPHU6\ULDQFRORQHOZKRGHIHFWHGWR6\ULDVWDWHG³WKHGLVWUXVW
between the Sunnis and Alawites in the military has grown so deep that at night, when Sunnis are
put on guard duty at key installations, there are always Alawite guards assigned to watch the
6XQQLVROGLHUV´102
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As already highlighted by numerous sources, the ethnic divide in Syria is further
amplified in the ranks of the military. While many of the common soldiers are Sunni Muslims,
those of higher ranks tend to be Alawite. This had led to a divide similar to that which was seen
during the Egyptian revolution, in which the actions of soldiers do not always reflect the
opinions of the command. Since the Alawites are the minority and may face persecution should
$VVDG¶VUHJLPHWRSSOH³WKHHOLWHXQLWVVSHFLDOIRUFHVDQGLQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQFLHVPD\KDYHOLWWOH
choice but to rally around the Asad regime, given their bleak prospects in a post-$VDG6\ULD´103
Therefore, this greater loyalty demonstrated by the Alawite minority in the armed forces may be
driven more by fear than shared ideology DV³PDQ\UHPDLQFRQYLQFHGWKDWDVSLULWRIUHYHQJH
PD\JXLGHWKHRSSRVLWLRQZKLFKKDVEHHQVREDGO\DEXVHG´DQGWKH\PDQ\IDFHSersecution if the
Sunni majority comes to power. 104 However, ethnic connections cannot determine the outcome
RIWKHPRYHPHQWDORQH$VDUJXHGE\WKH&KULVWLDQ6FLHQFH0RQLWRU³ZLWKRXWDILUP
commitment to civil disobedience, the largely Sunni protestors may not be able to gain the
VXSSRUWRI6\ULD¶VPLQRULWLHVLWVPHUFKDQWVRUHYHQWKH6XQQLVROGLHUVLQWKH$UP\´105

A nalysis of Major F indings
This hypothesis appears to have some significance especially during the examination of
my case study of Syria. Those soldiers who are Sunni, and therefore of a different ethnic group
than President Assad, show an increased likelihood of defecting in comparison to their Alawite
counterparts. From a purely qualitative standpoint using previously published interviews on
GHIHFWRUV,FDQQRWVD\KRZPXFKWKLVLQFUHDVHLQGHIHFWLRQFRPHVIURPWKHVROGLHU¶VDELOLW\WR
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better identify with the general population in comparison to the regime through their ethnic
makeup or to what extent it could be attributed to their lower position in the military as they face
a lower power incentive to remain loyal to the regime than the military elite.106
However, Egypt, which previously experienced clashes between Muslims and Coptic
Christians, appeared to have no significant divisions within the military due to religious or ethnic
differences and no defections were cited as being driven by these differences. This is possibly
GXHWRWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶VEUHYLW\DVUHOLJLRXVWHQVLRQVin Egypt increased significantly after
0XEDUDN¶VUHVLJQDWLRQZLWKWKHFRQWURYHUVLDOUHHPHUJHQFHRIWKH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGDVDNH\
player in Egyptian politics. As Libya is relatively homogenous in regards to religion and
ethnicity, this variable did not come into play during the conflict as either a divisive factor to the
movement or as a cause of military defections. However, the role of clans and kinship in the
region should be further addressed as it has the potential to correlate to this hypothesis.

H 2-Military personnel are more likely to defect if the international community promises direct
military intervention in opposition to the current regime.

Egypt- T he Role of International Intervention
'HVSLWH(J\SW¶VKLVWRU\RIUHSUHVVLQJWKHSROLWLFDOIUHHGRPVRILWVSHRSOHXQGHU3UHVLGent
Mubarak, Egypt still found favor with the West. According to a recent Congressional Research
VHUYLFHUHSRUWFLWHGE\1%&3ROLWLFV³Between 1948 and 2011, the United States provided Egypt
with $71.6 billion in bilateral foreign aid, including $1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987
to the present. Since 1979, Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S.
bilateral foreign assistance."107 This aid has helped ensure that Egypt would not act aggressively
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towards Israel and would abide by their 1979 peace agreement. Mubarak also took steps during
his time in office to strengthen Egyptian relations with the Arab world. This was done by
(J\SW¶VUHWXUQWRWKH,VODPLF&RQIHUHQFHWKH,VODPLF'HYHORSPHQW%DQNDQGWKH$UDE/HDJXH
in addition to other Arab organizations located and operated in the region. 108 Therefore, while
WKHUHKDGEHHQVLJQLILFDQWLQWHUQDOXQUHVWXQGHU0XEDUDN(J\SW¶VVWDQGLQJLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community was fairly stable.
On February 1, 2011, President Obama commenGHGWKH(J\SWLDQPLOLWDU\IRU³WKH
professionalism and patriotism that it has shown thus far in allowing peaceful protests while
SURWHFWLQJWKH(J\SWLDQSHRSOH´109 While this statement by Obama acknowledged of the
legitimacy of the protests by the international community, the United States did not publically
RIIHUDVVLVWDQFHWRWKH(J\SWLDQVXQWLOWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQ7KHQ8QLWHG6WDWHV¶DLGZDV
offered to help manage the aftermath of the revolution. This served as a signal to the Egyptian
military that while the United States routinely provides their armed forces with aid, they would
remain largely uninvolved in this matter. At most the United States threatened the end of military
aid and cooperation if the crackdowns were to become too violent or if American weapons were
used.110 Like the United States, most other nations called for the situation to remain nonviolent
with many expressing support for the Egyptian people with the exception of Saudi Arabia as
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz argued that the Egyptian people ³have tried to destabilize the
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security and stability of Egypt.´111 From the research I have done, no direct international military
intervention occurred on behalf of the opposition or the regime.

L ibya- T he Role of International Intervention
,QUHJDUGVWR/LE\D¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WKHQDWLRQKDVORQJEHHQ
RQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶OLVWDVDPDLQVSRQVRURILQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVP6WUDLQHGUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH
United States go back to the 1969 revolution which first put Gaddafi in power. However, the
United States did resume full diplomatic relations with Libya on May 31, 2006, the first time
since 1980. Relations remained stable until February 2011 when the United States suspended
Embassy operations in Tripoli.112 Libya had also sporadically found itself subject to UN
VDQFWLRQVGXULQJ*DGGDIL¶VUXOH*DGGDIL¶VXQVXFFHVVIXOIRUHLJQSROLF\DORQJZLWKVLJQLILFDQW
economic downturns bred discontent within the nation. During this time Libya also struggled to
unite with other Arab sWDWHVLQWKHUHJLRQKRZHYHUDFFRUGLQJWR6SHQFHU³RWKHU1RUWK$IULFDQ
heads of state have continued to work with him on the basis that it is safer to have Gaddafi inside
WKHFLUFOHWKDQLVRODWHGRXWVLGH´113 While relations between the West and Libya have often been
VWUDLQHGWKHFRXQWU\¶VOXFUDWLYHRLOLQGXVWU\KDVFRQWLQXHGWRIDFLOLWDWH/LE\D¶VLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK
the West.
According to Juan Cole¶VDUWLFOH³5HYROXWLRQDU\6LWXDWLRQLQ/LE\D´ the division of
/LE\D¶VPLOLWDU\IRUFHVRFFXUUHG in February prior to the international intervention by NATO.114
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Cole, whose article was published on February 21, 2011, describes the Libyan military in
Benghazi as having already split into two forces with one joining the crowd of nonviolent
protestors before the two sides engaged each other in hostilities. He also discusses the defection
RIPDMRUWULEHVDQG³WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWZRGLVWLQFWFDPSVZLWKDXWKRULW\LQWKHVDPH
FRXQWU\´115 Despite this major split, it was not until March 17, 2011, approximately one month
after active resistance to the government first appeared on a significant scale, that the UN
6HFXULW\&RXQFLODSSURYHGDPDQGDWHDOORZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOIRUFHVWRXVH³DOOQHFHVVDU\
PHDVXUHV´WRSURWHFWFLYLOLDQV116 As Dadler and Stavirdis describe in their articOH³1$72¶V
9LFWRU\LQ/LE\D7KH5LJKW:D\WR5XQDQ,QWHUYHQWLRQ´³WKHLQLWLDOLQWHUYHQWLRQUHVFXHGWKH
SHRSOHRI%HQJKD]LREOLWHUDWHG/LE\D¶VDLUGHIHQVHV\VWHPZLWKLQKRXUVDQGGHSOR\HG
DLUFUDIWDQGQDYDOYHVVHOVWRHQIRUFHWKH81UHVROXWLRQ´117 While the intervention was primarily
led by the United States as President Obama took over the command of the operation, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece, Norway,
the United Arab Emigrants, Sweden, Turkey, Qatar, and Romania all partook in the efforts to
police the arms embargo, patrol the established no-fly zone, and protect Libyan civilians.118
One factor that particularly sets Libya apart from other nations involved in the Arab
Spring movement was this decision by the international community to directly intervene as well
as the motives and strategies behind the intervention. The French, British and Americans used
WKHFRQFHSWRI³5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URWHFW´ 53 RU³2SSRUWXQLW\WR,QWHUYHQH´, more formally
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NQRZQDV815HVROXWLRQZKLFKDXWKRUL]HVWKHXVHRI³DOOQHFHVVDU\PHDQVWRSURWHFW
civilians and civilian-SRSXODWHGDUHDV´WRFDUU\RXW³SUHHPSWLYHDHULDODWWDFNV´WREULQJGRZQWKH
Gaddafi regime.119While partially done in the name of democracy and protecting freedom, this
intervention was also likely driven by other factors particularly oil. As renowned American
VFKRODUDQGPRGHUQ0LGGOH(DVWKLVWRULDQ-XDQ&ROHSRLQWHGRXW³/LE\DLVDQRLOVWDWHWKDW
exports 1.7 million barrels a day, its fate has more immediate implications for the international
community than unrest in non-RLOVWDWHVVXFKDV7XQLVLD´120 Despite this powerful response from
the international community, I found no evidence to suggest that the intervention by NATO
resulted in an increase in defections by military personnel.

Syria- T he Role of International Intervention
Despite similarities between the civil wars in Libya and Syria there are also plenty of
differences between the two. Unlike Libya, Syrians were rather adamant about keeping the
international community from intervening at the beginning of the revolution. However, since
then this sentiment has somewhat faltered as civilians have realized that toppling Assad would
take time and come at a heavy price. According to New York Times writer Neil MacFarquhar,
WKLVZDULQHVVODUJHO\VWHPVIURP6\ULD¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH American intervention in Iraq and the
disbanding of the Iraqi military.121 7KHUHIRUH³PDQ\RIILFHUVZDU\RIWKHSRVVLEOHIRUHLJQ
military intervention someday, choose to stay because they want to help prevent in Syria what
KDSSHQHGLQ,UDT´122 A similar sentiment was expressed by UN diplomat Kofi Annan as he
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cautioned against international intervention in Syria because armed foreign interventions have
had mixed results in the past. Annan went on to make an indirect reference to Iraq when he
VWDWHG³:HGRQ¶WKDYHWRJRYHU\IDULQWKHUHJLRQWRILQGDQH[DPSOHRIZKDW,¶PWDONLQJ
DERXW´123
When comparing the situation in Syria to Libya it is important to note that while the
Libyan intervention was largely led by the United States, it was sanctioned by the United Nations
and was carried with significant international support by fourteen NATO member nations and
four partners unlike Iraq.124 However, at this point it appears that a large scale direct
intervention, particularly by the West, in Syria is rather unlikely. China and Russia have also
adamantly opposed any type of direct intervention by the United Nations. Therefore a unified
international effort is currently not on the table.125 Despite their inaction, the international
community has strongly warned the regime that it will not sit idle if Assad chooses to use
chemical warfare upon his own people at any point. However, the Syrian government denies that
it has access to such chemical weapons. Having never been a member of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the Syrian government has not had to publically declare that it possesses chemical
weapons.126
Although large scale intervention has been ruled out at the moment for Syria, especially
by a united international community force, other countries have interfered to varying degrees. In
October 2012 Turkey and Syria exchanged fire and the aircrafts of both countries became banned
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IURPHDFKRWKHU¶VDLUVSDFHV,VUDHODOVRHQJDJHGLQWKHFRQIOLFWLQ-DQXDU\E\ILULQJPLVVLOHV
from aircrafts at a Syrian military research center. Tensions were further increased as Iran has
declared that an attack on Syrian by Israel will be seen as an attack by Israel on Iran. However,
despite a firm stance by the international community on having no unified military intervention,
the United States, Britain, Turkey, and Gulf States have at this time officially declared that the
OHJLWLPDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH6\ULDQSHRSOHLVQRZ6\ULD¶VRSSRVLWLRQ1DWLRQDO&RDOLWLRQ127
Since it has become evident that the international community is conflicted over the
situation in Syria and is unlikely to intervene in mass, it is unlikely that this slim possibility of a
direct military LQWHUYHQWLRQZLOOKDYHDQ\LQIOXHQFHRQVROGLHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRGHIHFWDWWKLVWLPH I
also did not find any evidence of the original possibility of international intervention resulted in
an increase in military defections. Instead, many were wary of this possible intervention and
FKRRVHWRFRQWLQXHWREDFN$VVDG¶VUHJLPH128

A nalysis of Major F indings
Direct international intervention in opposition to the current seems to have little promise
LQUHJDUGVWRSRVLWLYHO\LPSDFWLQJDVROGLHU¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHIHFW&XUUHQWO\WKHUHLVOLWWOHSULRU
literature on the influence of international intervention on the likelihood of defection and little
exploration of this variable in regards to my case studies. In the case of Egypt this factor was
simply absent as the international community generally did not respond to the situation in any
manner of significance until after its conclusion and direct intervention did not occur.
In regards to Libya, while NATO did intervene and largely shaped the outcome of the
movement, the majority of soldier defections, as depicted by the resources available at this time,
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occurred prior to the actual promise of international intervention. In Syria, the threat of
international intervention even went as far as to influence soldiers to continue to fight for a
regime whose policies they disagreed with. According to the interviews with Syrian defectors
and civilians, they continued to support Assad or were more hesitant in defecting simply because
they viewed the regime as the lesser of two evils in comparison to having another country
intervene.129
One difficulty that arose when analyzing this variable was what has actually comprised as
international intervention in these cases. In each case study it was not the same entity that was
doing the intervening or threatening to intervene and what interventions that have occurred have
been done using different methods to varying degrees. For example, NATO was the intervening
IRUFHLQ(J\SWDQGWKHLUPDLQDLPVZHUHWRDLG/LE\DQVUHVLGLQJLQ%HQJKD]LGHIHDW/LE\D¶VDLU
defense system, and enforce the UN resolution.130 On the other hand, there was no direct
interventioQE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\LQ(J\SW,QFRPSDULVRQ6\ULD¶VFDVHKDVEHHQPXFK
more complex. While the international community has not had a unified response to the
situation, multiple other countries such as Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon have exchanged
KRVWLOLWLHVZLWK$VVDG¶VUHJLPH7KHUHIRUHWKHUHDFWLRQVRIWKHDUPHGIRUFHVFDQQRWEHPHDVXUHG
against a consistent international actor that has acted as an intervening force. In conclusion, not
only does this hypothesis show little promise of holding true in the manner in which it is
currently formatted, it would also be unwise to suggest the hypothesis is able to be generalized.
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H 3-Military personnel are more likely to defect if the regime orders them to fire upon or in any
other way violently crackdown on unarmed civilians and conversely, military personnel are less
likely to defect if the opposition is armed and violent.

Egypt- T he Role of V iolent C rackdowns and A rmed O pposition

The nonviolent movement in Egypt was skillfully planned using traditional and modern
tactics to encourage mass mobilization with numbers reaching up to 15 million. According to
academic Emad El-'LQ6KDKLQ³WKHSUHGRPLQDQWO\QRQYLROHQWVWUDWHJ\WKDW the protesters
adopted accentuDWHGWKHUHJLPH¶VEUXWDOUHSUHVVLYHPHasures and fostered domestic and
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVXSSRUWIRUWKHUHYROXWLRQ´131 3URWHVWRUVZHUHDOVRXUJHG³WRDGRSWWKHµKXJD
VROGLHU¶ strategy´132 7KLV³KXJDVROLGHU´VWUDWHJ\ZDV³a way of saying that the struggle is
against the dictatorship not rank and ILOHVROGLHUV´DQGZDVGRQHWRDVVXUHVROGLHUVWKDWSURWHVWRUV
were not there to attack them, but rather wished to collaborate to build a brighter future for
Egypt. 133 While the movement lacked a central figure, this did not hinder its effectiveness.
Instead, this lack of a figurehead may have made the movement more inclusive and better able to
gather large numbers for protests and mass demonstrations such as the iconic protests in Tahrir
Square. The nonviolent movement was able to do this by uniting Egyptians of diverse
backgrounds, through maintaining an unwritten policy of tolerance, acceptance, and pluralism
which reached across all social classes.134
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7KHUHVSRQVHRIWKH(J\SWLDQDUPHGIRUFHVWRWKHSHRSOH¶VXSULVLQJPXVWEHEURNHQLQWR
two categories as military personnel from different ranks faced different loyalty incentives. First,
there must be an analysis of the actions of lower ranking military officials. Following that, the
DFWLRQVRI(J\SW¶VPLOLWDU\JHQHUDOVZLOOEHH[DPLQHG7KHDYHUDJHVROGLHUduring the Egyptian
5HYROXWLRQDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQPRUHV\PSDWKHWLFWRZDUGVWKHLUIHOORZFRXQWU\PHQ¶VFDXVH
than the generals whose actions were more of calculated strategy. Soldiers in the square also had
direct contact with the protestors which humanizHGWKHP$V6KDKLQGHVFULEHG³SURWHVWRUV
JUHHWHGWKHPLOLWDU\ZLWKIORZHUVKXJVDQGVORJDQVFKDQWLQJZLWKHQWKXVLDVPµ7KHPLOLWDU\DQG
WKHSHRSOHDUHRQHKDQG¶´135 According to one reporter during the early days of the revolution,
³LWZDVXQFOHDUZKHWKer the soldiers in the streets were operating without orders or in defiance of
them. But their displays of support for the protesters were conspicuous throughout the
FDSLWDO´136
Protestors in turn welcomed the military presence in the streets, preferring it over that of
the police.137 They encouraged members of the armed forces to join them in their fight to remove
Mubarak from power and many individuals did just that. According to Dina Shehata, military
HOLWHVUHFRJQL]HGWKLVIDOWHULQJOR\DOW\DV³(J\SW¶Vconscript army has so many ties to society at
large that, even had the generals been willing to shoot demonstrators, many officers and enlisted
PHQSUREDEO\ZRXOGKDYHUHIXVHGWRREH\VXFKDQRUGHU´138 The solidarity that soldiers felt with
the opposition mRYHPHQWZDVODUJHO\LQSDUWWRVROGLHUVEHLQJ³GLVSURSRUWLRQDOO\IURPWKHSRRU
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DQGGLVHQIUDQFKLVHGVHFWRUVRIVRFLHW\´ 139 Thus they could more easily identify with the
protestors and their dissatisfaction with the regime than the elites in the military.
The elites or generals in the military in comparison to most lower ranking military
SHUVRQQHOELGHGWKHLUWLPHGXULQJWKHUHEHOOLRQ7KH\FKRVHWRFRPSOHWHO\DEDQGRQ0XEDUDN¶V
regime only after determining that the people of the revolution were the likely victors and if they
remained supportive of the regime they would ultimately suffer, losing influence and power.
$IWHU0XEDUDN¶VILUVWDWWHPSWVRIFRQFHVVLRQDQGUHSUHVVLRQWKURXJKWKHXVHRIVWDWHSROLFHIRUFHV
horribly failed to regain control, the generaOVFRQFOXGHGWKDW³ULVLQJYLROHQFHDQGGLVRUGHUZRXOG
RQO\KXUWWKHPLOLWDU\¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGLQIOXHQFH´140 As previously examined, the military had
HFRQRPLFLQFHQWLYHWREDFN0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHDVWKHLURIILFHUV³GLUHFWO\SURILWIURPWKHDUP\¶V
business endeavors through relatively high salaries plus preferential treatment in medical care,
KRXVLQJDQGWUDQVSRUW´141 However, these incentives were simply not enough in the end. For
RQH(J\SW¶VJHQHUDOVKDGH[WUHPHFRQWHPSWIRU*DPDO0XEDUDNWKHVRQDQGOLNHO\Vuccessor of
the President. In addition they also were displeased by the increasing transfer of power and
privileges from the military to the state police. These factors would ultimately cost Mubarak his
most important pillar of support.
It was on January 30th, only five days after mass protests in Cairo began, that the military
PDGHWKHLUILUVWSXEOLFPRYHLQWKHIRUPRIDVWDWHPHQWRQ0HQVD(J\SW¶VVWDWH±run news
DJHQF\7KLVDQQRXQFHPHQWGHFODUHGWKDW³7KHSUHVHQFHRIWKHDUP\LQWKHVWUHHWVLs for your
sake and to ensure your safety and wellbeing. The armed forces will not resort to the use of force
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DJDLQVWRXUJUHDWSHRSOH´142 At the time the motive of this announcement was somewhat unclear.
Egyptians and the international community were unsure as to whether it was done in attempts to
pacify the protestors, or if it was the first sign of the overall weakening of military support for
Mubarak. Although this declaration did not help Mubarak retain effective control, the military
did not take an active opposed position to the regime or one that favored the protestors; instead,
this proclamation by the Egyptian military to refrain from force remained one of calculated
neutrality.

L ibya- T he Role of V iolent C rackdowns and A rmed O pposition
In early February 2011, Juan Cole reported that tens of thousands held a rally in
Benghazi. When the regime attempted to violently suppress these protestors, killing dozens,
some dissent arose within the military. While several military units joined the protestors in
solidarity, others remained loyal to the regime. These now opposing forces began firing at one
DQRWKHU7KLVGLVFRQQHFWZLWKLQWKHDUP\VLJQDOHGWKDW*DGGDIL¶VPLOLWDU\SLOODURIVXSSRUWZDV
VWDUWLQJWRFUXPEOHDV*DGGDIL¶VVXSSRUWHUVEHJDQILJKWLQJDJDLnst a rebel force led by Libyan
military defectors. 143 $V0RKDPHG%RX]DQDGHVFULEHG³7KLVPLOLWDU\GLYLVLRQZDVREYLRXV
since the early days of the Libyan uprising, when many of the military commanders abandoned
their uniforms and walked away from what they described as a dictatorship, while others stayed
WRGHIHQGWKHUHPQDQWVRI*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPH´144 However, this divide in the loyalty of the armed
forces can also be explained by examining its power structure. As described by Lutterbeck in his
analysis of civil-PLOLWDU\UHODWLRQVGXULQJWKH$UDE6SULQJ³WKHOR\DOW\RIWKHHOLWHXQLWVPRVW
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FORVHO\OLQNHGWR4DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHZDVXQZDYHULQJWRWKHYHU\HQGDQGWKH\UHVSRQGHGZLWKRXW
UHVWUDLQWWRWKHXSULVLQJV´145

Syria- T he Role of V iolent C rackdowns and A rmed O pposition
Despite the situation in Syria becoming increasingly violent, there have been signs that
the nonviolent movement has persisted as well. At times the nonviolent movement has even
worked in connection with the armed opposition. While the Free Syrian Army (FSA) often
openly engages in violence against the regime, and this portion of the uprising is typically most
highlighted by the media, they have also served as protectors to the nonviolent movement. When
possible, the FSA has maintained presence DWGHPRQVWUDWLRQVWRSURWHFWWKHSHRSOHIURP$VVDG¶V
army and snipers although this has been more difficult as the conflict in Syria has become
increasingly violent in nature$VDUHSRUWIURPHDUO\KLJKOLJKWVWKLV³SUHVHQFHRIWKH)6$
at protest sites has re-energized protesters, who are coming out in increasing numbers even as the
UHJLPHHVFDODWHVLWVYLROHQFHDJDLQVWWKHP´146
There has been a downside to the )6$¶VDUPHGGHIHQVHRIQRQYLROHQWSURWHVWRUV as
connections have been made between the pacifism used by revolutionary groups committed to
nonviolence and military defectors resorting to violence when they attempt to aid the
PRYHPHQW¶VFDXVH$V6\ULDQDFWLYLVW$EX*KD]LH[SODLQHG³7KHUHYROWEHFDPHPLOLWDUVHG
because the army was so violent against peaceful protesters that soldiers and officers, moved by
WKHLUFRQVFLHQFHVWDUWHGWRGHIHFW´147 However, it is important to note that while military
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defectors who brought their weapons with them militarized the opposition force, not all defectors
haYHMRLQHGWKH)6$*KD]L¶V sentiment was reaffirmed by an article in the Christian Science
0RQLWRUZKLFKWRRNDVLPLODUVWDQFHGHFODULQJWKDWWKHUHJLPH¶VRUGHUVRIEUXWDOFUDFNGRZQVRQ
SHDFHIXOSURWHVWV³PD\RQO\GULYHPRUHVROGLHUVWRGHI\WKHLUVXSHULRUV´148 Another article by the
&KULVWLDQ6FLHQFH0RQLWRUUHLWHUDWHVWKLVLGHDE\VWDWLQJ$VVDG¶V³YLROHQWFUDFNGRZQRQFLWLHV
like Homs and Hama is designed to force the people to take up arms, which in turn allows him to
warn Syrian minorities to stick with KLPDQGHQGRUVHKLVLURQILVW´WKXVOHJLWLPL]LQJWKHXVHRI
violence by the regime.149
Regardless of if they had intended to join the opposition or not, some soldiers who have
defected and been caught by the regime have faced bleak fates. In some instances, the
government has made an example of these defectors by ordering public executions.150 Regardless
of the risks, many have continued to defect on moral grounds as they object to violently
suppressing their fellow countrymen. As Brig. Gen. Mohammed Hassoun stated he defected
because, ³,WKRXJKWWKHDUP\ZDVEXLOWIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIILJKWLQJIRUHLJQHQHPLHVnot targeting
our own civilians´.151 +DVVRXQ¶VVHQWLPHQWKDVEHHQUHLWHUDWed by countless defectors from
across the ranks of the Syrian military.

A nalysis of Major F indings
First of all, it can be concluded that nonviolent resistance was a tactic utilized in each of
my case studies although to varying degrees and levels of success. As discussed by Ramin
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-DKDQEHJORRLQKLVDUWLFOH³5HDGLQJ*DQGKLLQ&DLUR´ ³PDQ\QRQYLROHQW0XVOLPDFWLYLVWVDQG
thinkers have played a role in opposing and checking the levels of violence both within their own
FRPPXQLWLHVDQGDJDLQVWRWKHUV´152 7KLVVXJJHVWV³WKHSUDFWLFDOVXFFHVVRIDQHWKLFDO
commitment to norms of transparenc\QHJRWLDWLRQFRPSURPLVHDQGPXWXDOUHVSHFW´153 While
the movements in Libya and Syria may not have remained nonviolent on a large scale, there is
still evidence that each of these movements began with nonviolent intentions and utilized
traditional nonviolent tactics such as mass demonstrations.
From the research I have done regarding the factors influencing defections within the
DUPHGIRUFHVDUHJLPH¶VFUDFNGRZQRQXQDUPHGFLYLOLDQVDSSHDUVWREHWKHPRVWFRPSHOOLQJRQH
of my three original hypotheses as it is the variable that soldiers have most often cited as their
reason for abandoning the regime. While the state police was willing to use violence against
QRQYLROHQWSURWHVWRUVLQ(J\SWWKHPLOLWDU\ZDVILUPLQGHFODULQJHYHQDIWHU0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPH
ordered it to fire upon civilians, that they would not resort to violence against the people.154
Therefore, while the military did not actively assist the revolutionaries, they defected through
their refusal to support the regime. In regards to Syria, there was also a significant portion of the
interviews with defectors that explicitly highlight the regime ordering violent crackdowns
against unarmed civilians as the primary reason for their defection. This hypothesis also appears
to have validity outside the VFRSHRIP\FDVHVWXGLHVDV=XQHVGHVFULEHV³)URPWKH3KLOLSSLQHV
to East Germany, autocratic rulers facing nonviolent civil insurrections ordered their troops to
ILUHRQXQDUPHGFURZGVRQO\WRKDYHWKHWURRSVUHIXVH´155
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The second portion of hypothesis H3, regarding the influence of an armed opposition on
OHVVHQLQJPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO¶VGHFLVLRQVWRGHIHFWDSSHDUVWRKDYHFRQVLGHUDEOHZHLJKWDVZHOO
According to Chenoweth, President Mubarak also believed there was merit in this theory and
³WRRNVXFKJUeat pains to use armed thugs to try to provoke the Egyptian demonstrators into
XVLQJYLROHQFHDIWHUZKLFKKHFRXOGKDYHUDOOLHGWKHPLOLWDU\EHKLQGKLP´156 In Libya, since the
opposition became armed soon after the revolution began it is somewhat difficult to conclude
how things may have been different had the revolutionaries and defectors remained nonviolent.
Syria however, like Egypt, also highlights the concern of the nonviolent movement in that they
rightly feared that if the movement resorted to violence it would not only decrease the likelihood
of more soldiers defecting, but also harm the legitimacy of the movement since the movement
ZRXOGORVHLWV³VXSHULRUPRUDOFKDUDFWHU´157 If support from the military or at minimum their
failure to act in order ensure the survival of a regime is necessary as this project stated at the
EHJLQQLQJDQGDPRYHPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRQRQYLROHQFHLVPRUHOLNHO\WROHDGWRLWVVXFFHVV
then using transitive logic, nonviolence is more likely to lead to an increase in defections by
military personnel. Conversely, violence by the opposition is more likely to decrease the
likelihood of defections.
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Conclusion
This project has sought to explain the factors that have influenced and continue to
influence soldiers to defect during the Arab Spring Movement in the conflicts of Egypt, Libya,
and Syria with a varying degree of success. Originally I proposed three hypotheses regarding the
likelihood of military defection which correlated with three specific independent variables: the
threat of international intervention, DUHJLPH¶VRUGHUVIRUWKHPLOLWDU\WRSDUWDNHLQDYLROHQW
crackdown against unarmed civilians and armed opposition, the impact of differences in
religious or ethnic identity between the regime, its soldiers, and the general population and the
opposition. When I started out this project I believed that the threat of international intervention,
and differences in the ethnic or religious makeup of the military and the regime would correlate
with higher rates of defection. On the other hand, I thought that armed opposition would have a
negative impact when a soldier weighed his/her reasons to defect. However, these original
assumptions do not all appear to have held true across when examining all three of my case
studies.
In regards to the role of religious or ethnic divisions on the loyalty of the military this
project did not come to one clear conclusion. While Egypt and Syria had previously experienced
religious and ethnic clashes prior to their respective revolutions, Muslims and Christians were
able to unite in Egypt during their collective effort to overthrow Mubarak. However, should the
revolution have lasted longer, this division could have potentially played a greater role. This is
somewhat likely since the religious division in Egypt has caused considerable tension during the
aftermath of the revolution, SDUWLFXODUO\GXULQJHOHFWLRQVDQGWKHUHZULWLQJRI(J\SW¶V
constitution. +RZHYHULIIRFXVLQJRQO\RQ(J\SW¶VSHULRGRIUHYROXWLRQHWKQLFDQGUHOLJLRXV
diviVLRQVSOD\HGQRQRWLFHDEOHUROHLQFRD[LQJPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOWRGHIHFWRULQRWKHUVROGLHUV¶
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choice to remain supportive of Mubarak. In Syria, on the other hand, the ethnic and religious
divides were highlighted almost to the extreme by the media community as one of the leading
catalysts of the revolution. This divide was also associated with leading to an increase in military
defections as Sunnis were portUD\HGDVEHLQJOHVVOR\DOWR$VVDG¶VSULPDULO\ Alawite regime and
more likely to defect and, in many cases, join the opposition. In Libya the ethnic and religious
makeup of the nation was too homogeneous to play a major role in the revolution. Therefore, this
hypothesis holds up for Syria, but had no impact in a religiously diverse Egypt and religiously
and ethnically homogeneous Libya. In conclusion, hypothesis one was not overly applicable in
the situation in Libya, but showed there was some correlation in religiously or ethnically
polarized nations such as Egypt and Syria.
In regards to the regime resorting to violence against nonviolent protestors this
hypothesis, previously examined by Chenoweth and Stephan, that states soldiers are less likely to
remain loyal to a regime that violently suppresses its unarmed civilians, holds true in all three of
my case studies. My analysis of the conflicts in Egypt, Libya, and Syria as well as the role of
military personnel during these periods of major unrest clearly demonstrates the reluctance of
soldiers to violently suppress civilians, especially when civilians oppose the government using
nonviolent tactics. 1RWRQO\ZHUHVROGLHUVOHVVOLNHO\WRREH\UHJLPH¶VRUGHUVWRILUHXSRQWKHLU
FRXQWU\PHQEXWWKH\ZHUHDOVRPRUHOLNHO\WRGHIHFWDQGWDNHXSWKHRSSRVLWLRQ¶VFDXVH
However, in some cases, primarily Syria, this led to the partial militarization of the nonviolent
movement as many of the defecting soldiers brought their weapons with them.
Conversely, when the opposition is armed, as it became in Syria particularly in the form
of the FSA and it was during most of the revolution in Libya, defections are significantly less
likely to occur. This is because the regime is able to legitimize their use of force in their struggle
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to maintain power. In this type of scenario it becomes less of the regime versus the people and
more the regime versus an armed threat. In the case of Egypt this variable was not significant as
violence carried out by the military forces was somewhat minimal even as regime backed thugs
and the state police forces violently suppressed demonstrators.
On the other hand, I greatly overestimated that the international community would have a
positive role in influencing defections. My original perception of the impact of international
intervention was perhaps too US-centric with too PXFKIDLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶V
ability and intent to alter the outcome for the best of the people. In Egypt, the revolution was
carried out solely by its own civilians and, while the international community kept a keen eye on
WKHVLWXDWLRQQRGLUHFWDFWLRQZDVWDNHQRQEHKDOIRI0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHRUWKHRSSRVLWLRQ
Although I knew Egypt as a case study lacked this particular variable I originally thought that
international intervention or just the increased attention of international community would have
more sway in causing defection in Libya and Syria. However, while international intervention,
primarily direct military intervention by NATO, played a significant role in determining the
oXWFRPHRI/LE\D¶VUHYROXWion and eventual civil war, it appeared to have little weight on a
soOGLHU¶VGHFLVLRQWRDEDQGRQ*DGGDIL¶V regime. Instead, the vast majority of the split from
*DGGDIL¶VIRUFHVDSSHDUVWRKDYHRFFXUUHGHDUO\RQLQWKHILJKWLQJ SULRUWR1$72¶Vdirect
involvement or any major discussion on the part of the international community to partake in
large scale interference. In Syria, international intervention has if anything proved to negatively
impact oQH¶VGHFLVLRQRQZKHWKHURUQRWWR defect. First of all, international interventional in the
form of military aid KDVSUDFWLFDOO\EHHQEORFNHGWKURXJK5XVVLDDQG&KLQD¶VDELOLW\WRYHWRWKH
call for UN action; thus, it was evident that the Syrian opposition would not be getting boots on
the ground assistance from this forum. Therefore, without further in depth interviews with
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soldiers it is uncertain of how realistic they viewed the possibility of international intervention to
be from this international organization. Some accounts also showed the possibility of foreign
intervention was viewed with hostility by the some military personnel, even those who chose to
defect, simply because they associated foreign intervention with the American led war in Iraq.
Despite my hypotheses inability to hold strong across the board, I am still pleased with
my research as research LVPHDQWWRGRPRUHWKDQWRSURYHDUHVHDUFKHU¶Voriginal instincts
infallible. Instead these flaws exposed by my research have further showed what more needs to
be done to adequately address this question in the field of revolutionary studies. These potential
steps will further be addressed in the next and final section- Where to Go From Here.
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:KHUHWR*R)URP+HUH«
While a significant start to exploring the factors that influence military personnel to
defect during revolutions, this project merely scrapes the surface of this phenomenon. To
adequately explore this event more information needs to be gathered and analyzed to put the
exploration of this question up to par with the other focuses of research that already exist
regarding the study of revolutions. It would also be beneficial to examine revolutions outside the
scope of the Arab Spring for greater comparison. While I am still pleased with my decision to
focus on recent revolutions, I believe it would be greatly beneficial to go back and even
reexamine these events, and particularly the military defections that defined them, several years
from now as things settle down in the region. While it is unlikely there will be a substantial
amount of information published regarding soldiers¶ decisions to defect years after the regime
changes are carried out as this has not been the case with prior literature on older revolutions,
there is a greater likelihood that one would be able gather more information through primary
sources such as direct interviews with defectors instead of having to rely so heavily on other
secondary sources. This would be greatly beneficial as it is unlikely as well that any specific
statistics on military defections will publically be reported at any point. As the region finds
greater stability it should make it easier for academics to travel to the area and more likely for
individuals to be willing to speak up about their decisions as the threat posed to themselves and
their families should dwindle with time. As the conflict in Syria looks appears that it is drawing
closer to an end and that all the original regimes focused on in this study are to be ousted, it is
more likely that defectors will be willing to speak up in the near future.
While the three original independent variables I focused on were present in numerous
defectors¶ accounts of what led them to defect, I knew these three variables were unlikely to
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address all of the reasons behind each soldier¶VGHFLVLRQ to defect. I also greatly underestimated
just how many other independent variables there would be weighing in to these decisions as well
as their overall significance. In addition, I had the tendency to overestimate similarities between
case studies. For one, ethnic and religious make up had little influence on soldiers¶GHFLVLRQV to
defect in Libya; however, their clan identity played a significant role. For example, when the
Warfala WULEHDQQRXQFHGLWZDVVLGLQJZLWKWKHRSSRVLWLRQLQVWHDGRI*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHWKHWULEH
spoke for the million Libyans that belong to this extensive kinship group. The Arab Warfala
leaders were also able to convince the Bebers of the southern Tuareg tribe to oppose Gaddafi
thus supporting the opposition with another 500,000 Libyans.158 These kinship and clan
connections had significantly greater impact on the situation in Libya than expected because my
knowledge on clan and kin ties was minimal when I began this project. As previously discussed,
another overlooked yet very significant factor that influenced whether or not a soldier would
defect was his/her ability to not only ensure his/her survival, but also the survival of his/her
family.
Another example of a variable that could be examined using this research design would
be the ability of a soldier to ensure the safety of their family. In the words of one former Syrian
intelligence officer who was interviewed by The Wall Street Journal, ³$OO,FRXOGWKLQk about
ZDVWKDW,KDGWROHDYHWKHDUP\«%XW,KDGWRVHFXUHP\IDPLO\ILUVW´159 While I originally
overlooked this variable mostly due to its simplicity when presenting my original three variables,
LWSURYHVWREHH[WUHPHO\VLJQLILFDQWLQDVROGLHU¶VGHFLVion to defect . In the research I examined,

158

Juan Cole. "Revolutionary Situation in Libya." Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and
Religion (blog), February 21, 2011, http://www.juancole.com/2011/02/revolutionary-situation-in-libya.html
(accessed November 4, 2012),
159
Maria Abi-Habib, ³:RUOG1HZV'HIHFWRU¶V5HFRXQW7DOHVRI&RQIOLFWµ%ORRGRQ0\+DQGV¶²Some Soldiers
/HDYH$VVDG¶V)RUFHV5HJUHWWLQJ&LYLOLDQ'HDWKV7KRXJK5HSULVDOV$JDLQVW)DPilies Discourage Mass Desertion.´
Wall Street Journal, Apr 18, 2012. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100189005?accountid=14070.

75

WKHDELOLW\RIDVROGLHUWRSURWHFWWKHLUIDPLO\ZDVFLWHGVHFRQGRQO\WRRQH¶VDEKRUUHQFHIRUWKH
UHJLPH¶VRUGHUVWRYLROHQWO\VXSSUHVVQRQYLROHQWSURWHVWRUVLQFRXQWOHVVDFFRXQWVRIVROGLHUV¶
explanations of their actions and motives for defection. This especially held true in Libya and
Syria where soldiers who had chosen to defect have met with violent consequences from the
regime; therefore, sending a message to their counterparts. Conversely, many of the soldiers who
morally sided with the opposition were still unwilling or reluctant to join them based on their
inability to ensure not only the safety of themselves and their families if they were to try to leave
WKHUHJLPH¶VVHUYLFHHowever, one Syria soldier DOVRVWDWHGWKDW³1RZ,¶PQRORQJHUILJKWLQJ
DQGOHIW6\ULDWKHSUHVVXUHRQP\IDPLO\LVOHVV´160
Yet another factor to consider in greater depth would be the professionalism of each
FRXQWU\¶VDUPHGIRUFHV)RUH[DPSOH(J\SW¶VPLOLWDU\LVDYHU\WUDGLWLonal and professional
entity. Officers are well trained and the military is well funded. As previously examined,
(J\SW¶Varmed forces are also well respected by the Egyptian people. According to Lutterbeck,
WKH(J\SWLDQDUPHGIRUFHV³FDQEHGHVFULEHGDVD SURIHVVLRQDODQGODUJHO\PHULWRFUDWLFIRUFH´161
A recent opinion poll also found that Egyptians believe that their armed forces are the most
respectable official institution in the nation and the one most committed to pursuing objectives
that are aligned with the national interest. 2QWKHRWKHUKDQG*DGGDIL¶VIRUFHVZHUHODUJHO\
organized in a decentralized manner with most of the military elites having either blood or clan
connections to Gaddafi. *DGGDIL¶VPLOLWDU\ZDVDOVR³GLYLGHGLQWRQXPHURXVRUJDQL]Dtions that
KDGOLWWOHFRQWDFWZLWKRQHDQRWKHU´162 Instead the regular military was primarily in charge of
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HQVXULQJ/LE\D¶VVHFXULW\DJDLQVWH[WHUQDOWKUHDWVDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VVHFXULW\IRUFHUHVSRQVLEOHIRU
the survival of the regime. %DUDQ\DOVRGHVFULEHV*DGGDILDVKDYLQJ³GHOLEHUDWHO\QHJOHFWWKH
military and gave priority treatment to parallel elite and paramilitary forces, most of the newly
HVWDEOLVKHGDQGFRPPDQGHGE\KLVUHODWLYHV´163 According to the Christian Science Monitor, the
Syrian armed forces are well organized DVLWKDVD³KLJKO\PHFKDQL]HGDUP\± built to fight the
,VUDHOLDUP\´164 +RZHYHUZKLOHVRPHRIWKHPLOLWDU\FRQVLVWVRISURIHVVLRQDOVPDQ\RI6\ULD¶V
soldiers are males conscripted into service at the age of eighteen for a compensatory 18
months.165 %\H[DPLQLQJWKHSURIHVVLRQDOLVPRIDFRXQWU\¶VDUPHGIRUFHVWKHOLNHOLKRRGRI
defection as well as the type of defection-.i.e. if a soldier would join an armed opposition group
or flee the country, would be easier to determine. This further insight would allow for a better
analysis of the difference in defection motives between the ranks of individuals as well.
Another way to expand this research and increase its validity would be to compare it to
other case studies outside of the Arab Spring Movement. This could be done in order to establish
whether or not the factors that influenced soldiers to defect in Egypt, Libya, and Syria were
unique to these movements, or if these results could be generalized to other movements that have
occurred across the globe in modern history. This expansion on my scope of focus would greatly
increase the worth of what research was done here although the existing research could still serve
as a foundation. It would also be interesting to see if the incentives that have persuaded soldiers
to defect have changed over the course of time at all.
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Lastly, while my work has focused primarily on sources such as newspaper articles and
itnerviews that have described LQGLYLGXDOV¶GHFLVLRQVWRGHIHFW in a manner which has often
lacked real depth or traceability, it would be extremely beneficial to add a quantitative side to all
of this information as well. This way more soldiers could be interviewed or surveyed and a
ranking system could be established to gauge what factors had the greatest weight in their
decision to defect. For example, while the order of violence against civilians by the regime was
evident in positively influencing soldiers to defect in all of my cases studies, it might have
played a lesser role in Syria than perhaps the religious and ethnic divide did. Interviewees could
also have the opportunity to present other reasons for their defections than those originally listed.
Through the use of a bigger sample, the choices of soldiers to defect in relation to their ranking
in the military could also be explored more in depth. This is helpful as a difference has already
been established between the choices of the military elites and the average foot soldier, but the
middle ranks have remained virtually unexplored as a subcategory. This could also better
establish if there is any correlation between what influenced a soldier to defect and what type of
defection he/she partook in, whether it was fleeing the country, refusing to carry out orders, or
becoming part of the opposition in addition to why they chose this type of defection. Like more
in depth qualitative analysis, quantitative information of these particular cases is unlikely to be
obtained at this time and therefore quantitative analysis is not currently a possibility for all three
of these case studies.
Therefore, while my research has added to the limited field of study focused on
defections during rebellion, there is still much more to be done. This section has just provided a
few ideas as to where research could be further expanded. There are plenty more variables, case
studies, time periods, and approaches to consider when asking what factors influence military
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defections during periods of rebellion. Hopefully the research done within these pages at least
adds to the discussion and starts to answer this multifaceted question.
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Appendix
Stories of Defection
To give further insight into the minds of defectors below are three interviews with
defectors from Egypt, Libya, and Syria from The Guardian, The New York Times, and Aljazeera
respectively.

Major Defection - Egypt166
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/nov/25/egyptian-military-defector-armyvideo
A Film By Guardian News & Media
Distributed By Journeyman Pictures
November 2011
³6SHDNLQJIURPDZLQGRZRYHUORRNLQJWKHFKDRVLQ7DKULUVTXDUH0DMRU7DPHU6DPLU%DGU an
army defector, claims that many Egyptian army officers have been secretly attending the protests
in civilian clothes.
Looking out over the turmoil in the square below, Major Badr explains how he came to defect
from the Egyptian military. "I saw people dying and the army gave the orders for us to just stand
and watch". After that, "I couldn't take it any longer", he says. He now feels it is his duty to
protect, "these people who are fighting for our rights". This candid interview, coupled with
startling LPDJHVRIWKHFXUUHQWFODVKHVJHWVULJKWWRWKHKHDUWRI(J\SW VODWHVWXSVXUJH´

166

³0DMRU'HIHFWLRQ- (J\SW´ 1RYHPEHU 9LGHRFOLS<RX7XEH www.youtube.com
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MH5AvhUPRag

86

µScores defect' from Gaddafi's army- Partial Article167
E ight high-ranking officers and 120 military officials " abandon " armed forces amid growing
pressure on L ibyan leader.
L ast Modified: 31 May 2011 03:10

Z uma's office insists that his visit to T ripoli was to address political reform and humanitarian
concerns [A F P]

More than 100 military officials and soldiers have defected from Libya's armed forces in recent days,
according to a group of eight military officers, as pressure mounts on leader Muammar Gaddafi to
step down.
The high-ranking Libyan army officers appeared at a press conference in Italy on Monday, where
they announced that they were part of a group of as many as 120 military officials and soldiers who
defected from Gaddafi's side in recent days.
The hastily called news conference was organised by the Italian government for the the eight officers
167

"'Scores defect' from Gaddafi's armyEight high-ranking officers and 120 military officials "abandon" armed
forces amid growing pressure on Libyan leader.." Aljazzera , May 31, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/05/20115308196965572.html (accessed April 19, 2013).
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- five generals, two colonels and a major.
"What is happening to our people has frightened us," said one officer, who identified himself as
General Oun Ali Oun.
"There is a lot of killing, genocide ... violence against women. No wise, rational person with the
minimum of dignity can do what we saw with our eyes and what he asked us to do."
Another officer, General Salah Giuma Yahmed, said Gaddafi's army was weakening day by day, with
the force reduced to 20 per cent of its original capacity.
"Gaddafi's days are numbered," said Yahmed.

Abdurrahman Shalgam, the Libyan UN ambassador, who has also defected from Gaddafi, said all
120 military personnel were outside Libya now, but he did not say where they were.
The news conference came as Jacob Zuma, South Africa's president, travelled to Tripoli for talks to
end the Libyan conflict.
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Soldier Says Syrian Atrocities Forced Him to Defect168

Daniel Etter for The New York Times

Ammar Cheikh Omar, center, a defector from the Syrian army to the opposition, played cards with other Syrian refugees at
an apartment in Antakya, Turkey.

By D A N B I L E F SKY
Published: F ebruary 1, 2012
HATAY, Turkey ² Ammar Cheikh Omar recalled the first time he was ordered to shoot into a
crowd of protesters in Syria. He aimed his AK-47 just above their heads, prayed to God not to
make him a killer and pulled the trigger.
Related
Mr. Omar, 29, the soft-spoken and wiry son of Syrian parents who immigrated to Germany in the
1950s, grew up in Rheda-Wiedenbrück, a prosperous village of half-timbered 16th-century
houses, where he listened to Mariah Carey and daydreamed about one day returning to Syria.
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Dan Bilefsky, "Soldier Says SyriaAtrocities Forced Him to Defect," The New York Times, sec. Europe, February
1, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/world/europe/soldier-says-atrocities-made-him-a-syriandefector.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 13, 2013),

89

Today, he is still trying to make sense of his unlikely transformation from a dutiful German
student to a killer for the brutal Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad and, ultimately,
DGHIHFWRU³,ZDVSURXGWREH6\ULDQEXWLQVWHDGEHFDPHDVROGLHUIRUDUHJLPHWKDWZDVLQWHQW
RQNLOOLQJLWVRZQSHRSOH´0U2PDUVDLGRQDUHFHQWGD\FKDLQ-smoking at a cafe in this
7XUNLVKERUGHUWRZQ³,WKDQN*RGHYHU\GD\ WKDW,DPVWLOODOLYH´
Human rights groups and Syrian activists said he was one of thousands of Syrians who had
inadvertently found themselves deployed as foot soldiers for a government that the United
Nations estimates has killed more than 5,000 people since the crackdown on demonstrators
began in March.
6ROGLHUVDUHW\SLFDOO\FRQVFULSWHGDWDJHZLWKPHPEHUVRI6\ULD¶V6XQQLPDMRULW\PDNLQJXS
the bulk of the army ranks and minority Alawites, who come from the same religious group as
Mr. Assad, often serving as high-ranking officers or in the state security apparatus. Mr. Omar, a
highly educated Sunni with flawless Arabic, gained entry to a security unit attached to the
Interior Ministry.
Human rights groups estimate that there are at least 5,000 defectors; an exact number is difficult
WRFRQILUPEHFDXVHPDQ\UHPDLQLQKLGLQJ³0U2PDU¶VKDUURZLQJWDOHILWVDQDOO-too-familiar
pattern in which soldiers are deployed away from their hometowns to help ensure that they will
be less likely to refuse an ordHUWRNLOO´VDLG2OH6ROYDQJDUHVHDUFKHUDW+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFK
ZKRKDVLQWHUYLHZHGGR]HQVRI6\ULDQGHIHFWRUVLQFOXGLQJ0U2PDU³+HZDVRQHRIWKHOXFN\
RQHVDVKHPDQDJHGWRHVFDSH´
7KHUHLVQRZD\WRFRUURERUDWHPXFKRI0U2PDU¶VDFFRXQWRIKLVjourney to becoming an
enforcer for the Assad government. Though human rights groups and activists operating in Syria
VD\LWILWVWKHSDWWHUQRIKXQGUHGVRIGHIHFWRUVZKRKDYHIOHGWKHFRXQWU\LWLVVLPSO\RQHPDQ¶V
tale. It began in 2004 when he left GerPDQ\IRU$OHSSRLQ6\ULD¶VQRUWKZLWKWKHDLPRIJHWWLQJ
in touch with his roots, studying law, improving his Arabic and finding a wife.
He managed to do all that, entering law school, marrying a doctor and, eventually, having a
child. His parents, meanwhile, had moved back to Aleppo because his father wanted to live out
his final years in the old country.
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In late 2010, Mr. Omar was conscripted into the Syrian military, just weeks before a Tunisian
fruit seller immolated himself and set off the wave of regional protests that eventually buffeted
Syria. At first, said Mr. Omar, who had always felt like an outsider in Germany, he was proud to
be serving the government. Soldiers were initially told that their main task was to defend the
country against Israel, he said. But when demonstrations erupted, they were told that the
SURWHVWHUVZHUH³WHUURULVWV´RU³DUPHGJDQJV´VSRQVRUHGE\IRUHLJQIRUFHV$FFHVVWRFHOOSKRQHV
non-state television or the Internet was strictly prohibited; breaching that rule was punishable by
up to two months in jail.
0U2PDU¶VILUVWGHSOR\PHQWZDVLQWKHVRXWKHUQFLW\RI'DUD¶DQHDU-RUGDQZKHUHKHDQGKLV
350-strong unit were sent in March to help crack down on intensifying demonstrations. He said
he had been ordered to arrest and shoot at dozens of protesters, including many young students,
who had scrawled antigovernment graffiti on the walls of the town.
³7KHDUP\QHHGHGHYHU\RQH,WZDVYHU\EUXWDO´KHVDLG³%XWLIWKHUH¶VDQRIILFHURIWKH
0XNKDEDUDWQH[WWR\RX´KHDGGHGUHIHUULQJWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VIHDUHGVHFXULW\VHUYLFHV³\RX
GRQ¶WKDYHDFKRLFHEXWWRVKRRW´
Every soldier was armed with 60 bullets and given new ammunition each night, Mr. Omar said.
His unit shot at the protesters from above a roof overlooking the mosque, killing at least six
people and wounding dozens more. One of his fellow soldiers began to scream uncontrollably
when he realized that his 18-year-old brother, demonstrating below on the street, had been shot.
The soldier buried him two days later.
Shaken by what he had seen, Mr. Omar said, he was determined to defect. But before he could
act, he was sent to Duma, northeast of Damascus, the capital, to work in a security unit
interrogating detainees.
Mr. Omar said he had been asked to take notes during the interrogation of prisoners, some as
young as 15 years old. He said demonstrators had been blindfolded and forced to strip to their
underwear before their hands were tied behind their backs. Interrogations were conducted by
four or five soldiers and officers in a dark, windowless room. He said the interrogating officer
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had ordered him to write down confessions naming protest leaders, confessions that detainees
were then asked to finger stamp rather than sign, since their hands were bound.
To force confessions, Mr. Omar said, the soldiers tortured the detainees with electrified cattle
prods, beat them or urinated on them. Some passed out. Others bled heavily. Many disappeared.
³7KHVROGLHUVGHPDQGHGWRNQRZZK\WKH\KDGJRQHWRWKHVWUHHWVDQGZKRKDGSDLGWKHP´KH
UHFDOOHG³,WZDVSDLQIXOWRZDWFK$WWKHEHJLQQLQJ,FRXOGQ¶WVOHHSEXWDIWHUDZKLOH,JRWXVHG
WRLW%XW,FRXOGQRWOLYHZLWKP\VHOILI,KDGUHPDLQHG´
As the protests gathered pace over the summer, Mr. Omar was sent to the central city of Hama,
where he was relieved of his AK-47 and instead given a shield and a stun gun, he said. With tens
of thousands of people on the streets in Hama, he said, he hoped he could disappear into the
crowd. At noon on July 26, he said, he and two fellow officers decided to defect from their army
base, changing into civilian clothes and jumping over the baVH¶VZDOO
They found refuge in the homes of people opposed to the Assad government, Mr. Omar said, and
wrapped scarves around their heads to conceal their faces. Fearing that he would be kidnapped or
³GLVDSSHDUHG´LQ6\ULDXQGHUVRPHIDOVHSUHWH[W0U2Par made a video, which he posted on
YouTube, to establish that he had defected.
The defectors traveled to the Turkish border in daylight, eventually abandoning their car and
walking through woods to avoid detection. At 7 a.m. on July 30, he said, they crossed illegally
into Hatay, where they met up with members of the rebel Free Syrian Army, settling in a refugee
camp.
At the camp, a gaunt and pale Mr. Omar produced another video to post on YouTube, in which
KHVDLGKHZDVDVKDPHGWKDWKHKDGEHHQSDUWRI0U$VVDG¶VIRUFHV³,ZLOOQHYHUIRUJHWWKHGHDG
ERGLHVRI\RXQJDQGROGPHQEXWDOVRZRPHQDQGFKLOGUHQRQWKHVWUHHWV´KHVDLGGUHVVHGLQD
uniform of the Free Syrian Army and appearing with a Syrian flag.
$SSHDOLQJGLUHFWO\WR*HUPDQ\KHDGGHG³+LWOHUGLHGLQ*HUPDQ\EXWDZRNHLQ6\ULD´
Germany eventually helped get him out of the camp so he could get a stamp in his passport to
remain in Turkey.
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Mr. Omar joined the rebel army, a scruffy group numbering around 10,000 soldiers, whose
mandate is to protect civilians from the government. He is now helping to smuggle wounded
rebels into Turkey, some of whom he houses in his home He said he supported the political
GHPRQVWUDWLRQVEXWZDUQHG³:HFDQQRWDIIRUGWRPHHWJXQVZLWKRQO\WDONDQGVORJDQV´
He fears for his family, including his wife, their 1-year-old daughter and his parents. After his
escape, he said, his brother-in-ODZZDVILUHGIURPKLVDUFKLWHFWXUHMREDQGWKHIDPLO\¶VKRXVHLQ
Aleppo was vandalized.
%XWKHVDLGKHKDGQRUHJUHWV³0\IDPLO\NQRZV,PDGHWKHULJKWFKRLFH´

Daniel Etter contributed reporting.
A version of this article appeared in print on F ebruary 2, 2012, on page A4 of the New York
edition with the headline: Soldier Says Syrian Shootings and Torture Led H im to Defect.
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